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Sri Lanka Navy Journal





SRI LANKA NAVY JOURNAL

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Sri Lanka Navy Journal is a bi-annual publication which provides the opportunity to discuss matters relevant to national interest and current global affairs. It serves as a potent medium for all serving members of the Navy to present their ideas, express their opinions and share their insights on subjects of national and global importance whilst enabling them to improve their writing skills and broaden their knowledge horizons.

The journal publishes papers and articles of professional interest to the Sri Lanka Navy.

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Design

Naval Research Wing

Publication

Sri Lanka Navy

P.O Box: 593,
Naval Headquarters,
Colombo 01.

T:P - 0112212225

E-mail: slnjournal@navy.lk
nrw@navy.lk

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FOREWORD



It gives me great pleasure to express my views on the latest issue of the 'Sri Lanka Navy Journal', the bi-annual professional publication. It provides the officers in the naval family with a good opportunity to sharpen their writing skills. Being a developing country, Sri Lanka is mindful of being in constant touch with the latest development around the globe.

The advent of digital technology has made most of things simpler. It has also made writing an obsolete skill. Even though we are living in an era where writing is out of fashion, it is one of the cherished forms of communication that a person should improve.

With the introduction of the 'Sri Lanka Navy Journal' we have created an ideal platform for the prospective writers of the Navy to enhance their abilities in writing. I am more than happy to witness the potential writers in the Sri Lanka Navy contributing to this cause with their academic papers and articles of professional interest to our organization.

I would also like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the Editorial Board for their indefatigable effort made in the compilation of this bi-annual publication published for the 4th time. If not for their commitment and dedication the Navy Journal would not have been a reality. I also urge everyone that has the habit of reading to make use of the opportunity to hone their writing skills by reading the journal.

"Writing brings various thoughts into one arena. It changes the reader into a new person"

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'RC Wijegunaratne'.

RC Wijegunaratne, WV, RWP & Bar, RSP, VSV, USP, ndc, psn
Vice Admiral
Commander of the Navy

MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Sri Lanka Navy's biannual academic publication, the Sri Lanka Navy Journal (SLNJ), cruises full steam ahead with the generous support received from varied quarters. The improvement it has made over a very short time span stands testimony to its success, which has enabled it to carve out a niche for academic excellence. The giant stride taken to explore our capacities and faculties to their very limits has, hence, paid rich dividends; it is reflected in many an accolade bestowed upon the journal, which is now in a league of its own.

True to its mandate, the SLNJ has created a ready-to-use platform, giving wings to fledgling writers so that they can savour the success of soaring higher and testing their skills to the fullest. Unless we take the plunge head-on and explore the very depths daringly, we will never be able to realize our full potential. Writing requires constant practice; exposure to different modes brings perfection a step closer.

Sri Lanka Navy is today poised for a new beginning with the acquisition of state-of-the-art platforms and the infusion of cutting-edge training to its personnel; their professional skills are being enhanced in collaboration with local and foreign experts, empowering them to take on the daunting challenges that lie ahead. The SLNJ lends its fullest support to this timely transformation, enriching the mind, the driving force behind any endeavour.

Like the previous issues, the SLNJ has been fortunate to secure the exclusive privilege of carrying a set of very informative articles courtesy the commendable efforts of the writers. They have ventured out to draw our attention to hitherto unexplored areas of their subject matter in order to fill the void that had marred our quest for professional excellence. As such, the topics selected for this edition focus on a wide range of issues, which are of immense importance to the discerning reader, both professionally as well as on a personal level.

The success of the SLNJ solely rests upon the generous patronage received from the Commander of the Navy, who leaves no stone unturned until the desired goals are achieved. Being at the helm, the Admiral keeps the Navy on a steady course with a broader vision well-crafted from his professional knowledge gained from an illustrious naval career spanning well over three decades. Amidst the busy schedule and setting an example to others, he keeps penning his thoughts in his well-received W-Memos that have now passed their 50th milestone, a no mean feat, with a fatherly concern for the naval family whose best interests he cherishes at the center of his heart.

The Commander's constant guidance has been a great source of inspiration for us to keep our trailblazing initiative afloat and expand our horizons constantly. Today, all can derive the benefit of the collective efforts made thanks to the whole-hearted contribution of many that are too numerous to be mentioned individually.

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A CASE ANALYSIS ON A SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) MISSION: WAY FORWARD TO MITIGATE FISHERY ISSUE BETWEEN INDIA & SRI LANKA

Captain (H) Prasad Kariyapperuma

"Maritime Search and rescue services throughout the world depend on ships at sea to assist persons in distress. A shipmaster's obligation to render assistance at sea is a longstanding humanitarian maritime tradition. It is also an obligation that is recognized by international law. Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) codifies this obligation."




Figure 1 - Diagram depicting the incident

Source: Compiled by the Author, using Navigational chart of Trincomalee to Point Calimere published at Taunton 18th December 1987 and accessed on 11th April 2014, Chart No: 1584.

Date and Time: 1215 Hrs. on 05th December 2013.

Location : West of Delft Island. GR 768797 (Delft map sheet No. 6).

The Coast Guard Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) CG 16 attached to the Navy Base at Delft Island (SLNS Wasabha) in a routine patrol sighted 4 civilians drifting towards the Delft Island with the help of floaters. Seeing the IPC in the vicinity, they started shouting for help. All 4 civilians were rescued by the IPC and taken into the Navy Base at Delft Island.

Incident:

Figure 2 – Rescued Indian fishermen facilitated by SLN

Source: 'Navy rescues 4 Indian fishermen from a capsized fishing boat', Sri Lanka Navy, Dec 6, 2013 a
<http://www.navy.lk> (Accessed 21 January 2017)

When questioning, they revealed that they were Indian fishermen who left Degadapatnam in Tamil Nadu, India at about 0500 Hrs. on previous day for fishing by their fishing boat. Whilst engaged in fishing, a defect developed in the engine and the boat lost the control and the stability. The fishing boat then toppled due to rough seas and sunk around 0030 Hrs. about 17 Nautical Miles off West of Delft Island. All 4 fishermen hung onto the debris of the sunken fishing boat which was acted as floaters. They floated towards the Delft Island due to under water currents and Tidal streams. The fishermen had suffered with minor injuries and they were treated by the medical staff of the Navy. All the fishermen were provided with food and clothing and they were handed over to the Delft Police station for further proceedings on completion of preliminary investigations by the Navy.

Analysing the incident:

This is a critical example of a Search and Rescue (SAR) mission carried out by the Sri Lanka Coastguard rescuing 4 lives out at sea. There are hundreds of fishing boats engaged in fishing in this sea stretch daily. Mainly they are Indian fishing boats. Sometimes their boats develop defects as it happened in this incident and may face distressed situations unexpectedly. You cannot always predict the sea condition and seas become extremely rough within short time period, mainly due to depressions and cyclonic effects in the Bay of Bengal. Some of these fishing boats are modern sophisticated ones with necessary equipment onboard which are capable of receiving weather warnings to take shelter in bad weather conditions. These boats also can withstand rough sea conditions due to their strong and design of the underwater hull area.

Most of the wooden hull trawlers and Dhows have weaker hulls comparing to the steel hull boats. Therefore they are more vulnerable in bad weather conditions. These fishing boats even do not have necessary equipment to receive weather warnings when they are out at sea. The most vulnerable fishing boats are the Dhows. They have only basic structures and limited facilities even without roofs.

Defining Search & Rescue (SAR):

Search and Rescue comprises the search for, and provision of aid to, persons, ships or other craft which are, or are feared to be, in distress or imminent danger and the use of available resources to assist persons or property in potential or actual distress using available personnel and facilities to locate persons in distress and rescue is an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.

International waters are divided into various regions according to the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) convention. Although the obligation of ships to go to the assistance of vessels in distress was enshrined both in tradition and in international treaties (such as the International Convention for the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS), 1974), there was no International system to cover search and rescue operations, until the adoption of the SAR Convention. In some areas there were well established organizations able to provide assistance promptly and efficiently, in others there was nothing at all. The 1979 Convention, adopted at a conference in Hamburg, was aimed at developing an International SAR plan, so that, no matter where an accident occurs, the rescue of persons in distress at sea will be coordinated by a SAR organization and, when necessary, by cooperation between neighbouring SAR organizations. Following the adoption of the 1979 SAR convention, IMO's Maritime Safety Committee divided the world's oceans into 13 search and rescue areas, in each of which the countries concerned have delimited search and rescue regions for which they are responsible. Provisional search and rescue plans for all of these areas were completed when the plan for Indian Ocean was finalized at a conference held in Fremantle, Western Australia in September 1998.

International obligations on Search & Rescue missions:

Maritime Search and rescue services throughout the world depend on ships at sea to assist persons in distress. A shipmaster's obligation to render assistance at sea is a longstanding humanitarian maritime tradition. It is also an obligation that is recognized by international law. Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) codifies this obligation.

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention regulation V/33.1 provides that the “master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance”. The SOLAS Convention also addresses in chapter V, regulation 7, the responsibility of Governments to ensure that necessary arrangements are made for distress communication and coordination in their area of responsibility and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around its coasts. These arrangements should include the establishment, operation and maintenance of such search and rescue facilities as are deemed practicable and necessary.




Figure 3 – SAR region of Sri Lanka

Source: 'SAR region of Sri Lanka', Sri Lanka Coast Guard, SLCG Headquarters (Accessed 26 April 2016)

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Effects of Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project:

The seas of Gulf of Mannar, Palk Bay and Palk Strait are not used by any ships except Naval and Coast Guard ships mainly due to shifting sand banks along the Adam's Bridge in Gulf of Mannar and the shallow depths in Palk Strait. The Adam's Bridge which made out of lime stones and shifting sand banks, divides the sea waters between India and Sri Lanka into two water bodies making it impossible to navigate a ship in this area. Only water jets and Fibre Glass Dinghies (FGD) can pass through Adam's bridge area due to its lower draft.

If India successfully completes the Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project, the sea areas in Gulf of Mannar, Palk Bay and the Palk Strait along the IMBL will be busy with ships traffic. The narrow channel also be more vulnerable for ships to navigate and can predict more accidents and collisions between ships. Therefore, this situation will demand effective Search and Rescue (SAR) mechanism in this area. Since this sea area is divided between India and Sri Lanka by IMBL (International Maritime Boundary Line), cooperation and coordination between Indian and Sri Lankan Navies and Coast Guards are vital to carry out joint Search and Rescue (SAR) missions.

Types of distress in IMBL area:

What kinds of distress are happening in this sea area at present? Several incidents can be highlighted. The most common distress is the development of engine and steering defects in which disable the boat and its movements. The grounding of fishing boats around Delft Island is also a common one. Since the coast around Delft Island is filled with limestone rocks, grounded fishing boats may damage their hulls underwater making it impossible to move. Some Indian fishing boats are in distress because they run short of the fuel to go back to India. Sometimes fishing boats may capsize due to bad weather and collisions endangering the lives of fishermen.

Search & Rescue mechanisms available in IMBL area:

What are the Search and Rescue (SAR) mechanisms available in this region? Naval and Coast Guard ships are utilized by both the countries covering critical sea areas around IMBL for 24 Hrs. every day. These ships carry out coordinated patrols along the IMBL and engage in Search and Rescue (SAR) missions when it is needed. Navy base at Delft Island (SLNS Wasabha) and the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) personnel placed at Kachchaitivu Island also play a major role in Search and Rescue (SAR) missions in IMBL area and providing necessary assistance to distressed fishermen mainly from India. The Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) of Navy and Coast Guard attached to SLNS Wasabha at Delft Island conduct daily morning and evening patrols around the Coast of Delft Island especially for search and rescue of distressed personnel and Boats. The SBS team in Kachchaitivu Island also conducts boat patrols utilizing Fibre Glass Dinghies (FGD) around Kachchaitivu sea searching of distress personnel and boats.

Sri Lanka Navy and the Coast Guard utilize Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV's), Coastal Patrol Craft (CPC) and Fast Attack Craft (FAC) to carry out Search and Rescue (SAR) missions in Gulf of Mannar, Palk Bay and Palk Strait. Indian Coast Guard ships and craft also make available in this region for this purpose. Any ships and craft out at sea are responsible for the conduct of Search and Rescue (SAR) missions when is demanded as per the International norms.

The Sri Lanka Coast Guard:

The conduct of Search and Rescue (SAR) and saving lives at sea in distress is a main responsibility of a Coast Guard. The Sri Lanka Coast Guard was established by the Act No. 41 of 2009 enacted by the parliament and functions under the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development. All major vessels and all the manpower were provided by the Sri Lanka Navy on secondment basis to the Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG).

The Sri Lanka Coast Guard is empowered with legal authority to search and arrest ships, craft and personnel engaged in illegal activities in maritime zones and the territorial waters of Sri Lanka and constitute legal proceedings against the offenders. Lifesaving is also a primary duty of a Coast Guard and Professional Life Saving Units are established in coastal areas. Within the short period of time after establishment of Sri Lanka Coast Guard, it has saved more than 200 lives including 29 foreign tourists who were in danger of drowning at sea. This is a considerable achievement by the Sri Lanka Coast Guard.

Conclusion:

The Sri Lanka Navy and the Coast Guard have assisted many Indian fishermen and their craft who were in distress in numerous ways. This is a good way of reacting to the allegations made by the state of Tamil Nadu accusing harassment to their fishermen by the Sri Lanka Navy. This will enhance the coordination and cooperation between fishing communities of India and Sri Lanka to solve fishery issues. This will definitely help Indian Government to mitigate the pressure exerted by the state Government of Tamil Nadu to go against Sri Lanka.

It is very important to strictly regulate safety measures and safety equipment onboard fishing boats when they are going out at sea. Before issuing licenses and registration of fishing boats, seaworthiness and availability of necessary lifesaving equipment should be thoroughly checked. The availability of life jackets and life belts are very much important to save lives at sea when they are in distress. The awareness and education of fishermen is a key factor to implement these measures. Sri Lanka also recently started implementing these life saving measures strictly after being issued a Yellow card followed by a Red card by the European Union against the IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing practices by Sri Lankan fishermen. It is further recommended to introduce an effective alert warning system to automatically alert shore stations when fishing boats are in distress. This should be a joint cooperative venture between the two Coast Guards of India and Sri Lanka.

India signed a tripartite maritime security pact with Sri Lanka and the Maldives in early July 2013. The deal includes joint cooperation on Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on surveillance, Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, working on anti-piracy efforts and sharing and tracking of merchant vessels using new technologies. This is a welcome measure to enhance the Search and Rescue (SAR) missions in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with joint cooperative and collaborative efforts. Joint Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts like this will definitely give more confidence to ships and craft which are using seas of Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for navigation. This will encourage these ships and craft to use harbours in the region more and more benefiting both India and Sri Lanka.

At present, only fishing boats from India and Sri Lanka use the seas of Gulf of Mannar, Palk Bay and the Palk Strait around the IMBL. This is due to shallow waters in this region and the shifting sand banks in Adam's bridge. Therefore existing Search and Rescue (SAR) mechanism by Sri Lanka Navy and the Coast Guards of India and Sri Lanka is sufficient and effective. If the proposed Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project comes into operation, this IMBL region will also utilize by the merchant ships. Due to narrow channel and availability of many fishing boats in this region will create more possibility for accidents. This will demand a joint SAR mechanism between Indian and Sri Lankan Coast Guards in this region.

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DOWNSIZING VS RIGHTSIZING: - SRI LANKA NAVY'S FUTURE FORCE

Captain (S) PRP Fernando

"The only thing we know about the future is that it will be different"

Peter Drucker

Australian born American Management Consultant

The first line of defence of an island nation must be a naval force. Sri Lanka is an Island nation and undoubtedly Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) is the first line of defence of our country. The coastal area around the country is 1600 Km and ocean area is 08 time greater than the land mass of the country. Our exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is 200 NM extending towards the ocean. Hence the shape and the size of the future naval force is required to be capable of meeting with the future challenges expected by the country from the ocean.

WHAT IS DOWNSIZING VS RIGHTSIZING:

The reduction of the work force may be called as downsizing. Which causes due to the reaction of outside forces, economic reasons, natural disasters or end of a war. Downsizing is not pleasant to the top level positions. It may be non-productive and lead to abandon the ongoing operations.

The phrase rightsizing is used in an organization as an euphemism or for downsizing to make it more pleasant. However rightsizing and downsizing have differences. To do rightsizing in an organization, the top-most positions of the organization need to look at future strategies, technologies, new ideas and alternative approaches etc. They need to pay attention to the future of the organization where the organization should head for and identify the priorities of the organization. What is right for the organization today may not be right for tomorrow. Hence rightsizing is a creative and constantly exciting process of adjusting an organization towards the most efficient and effective optimum with other competing similar organizations.

STRENGTH OF SOME OF THE TOP MOST AND REGIONAL NAVIES AND THEIR INVENTORIES OF VESSELS:

United States of America: At present according to the sources available, the top most blue water navy is United States Navy (US Navy). The strength of the Naval force is approximately 430000 personnel (329000 Actively in service and 101000 in reserve). They have 10 No's of Air craft carriers in service and 02 No's in reserve fleet, 272 No's of deployable combat vessels, 3700 No's of Air Craft in active service. Further they have shore establishments to support the missions of the fleet. The total land mass of the country is 3,794,100 Square miles and coastal line is 19920 Km (12380 miles). The role of the US Navy is power projection, crisis response and direct action.

India: The India is the 05th largest Navy in the world. The Indian Navy also is a blue water navy. The strength of the force is of approximately 58350 personnel according to the sources available. They have 04 commands namely Eastern, Western, Southern and Andaman and Nicobar Command. India has 7516 Km (4671 Miles) coastal line and the land area of 1,269,219 Square miles.

The Indian Navy also has a lot of assets in their inventory such as 02 No's of Air craft carriers, 10No's of Destroyers, 14No's of Frigates, 15 Submarines, 09 LST's, 200 No's of other ships and crafts. They also have 251 No's of Air craft. The roles of the Indian Navy are in conjunction with other forces, safeguarding the maritime interests of India both in war and peace, providing of maritime assistance to the India's maritime neighborhood.

Bangladesh Navy: Bangladesh Navy (BN Navy) is one of the smallest naval forces in the region comprising 16960 personnel including 1500 officers on active service and 8000 in the reserve. The coast line of the Bangladesh is 580 Km (360 miles) and land area is 56990 Square miles. The primary role of the BN Navy is to protect the country's economic and military interest at home and abroad. BN Navy is one of the key regional naval forces engaged in global peacekeeping with the United Nations. BN Navy has Frigates 06, Corvette 06, Long Patrol Boats 06, OPV's 11, FAC's 21 and other small crafts.

THE COMPARISON OF THE SRI LANKA NAVY (SLN) WITH THE BLUE WATER AND REGIONAL NAVIES:

The US Navy, IN Navy and Bangladesh Navy have more vessels and their sea area and land mass of the countries are larger than those of Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan Navy. The total strength of SLN is 55874 No's, comprising of 42650 No's regular and 13224 No's volunteer personnel actively in the service. It is quite clear that Current strength of the SLN is high when compared with the land mass of the Sri Lanka 65610 Square Kilometers (KM) (25332 Square miles) and about 1600 Coastal area around the country. The SLN is also maintaining small inventory of vessels too.

THE REASON FOR SWELLING THE STRENGTH OF SLN UP TO THE CURRENT STRENGTH:

Before the year 1983, SLN presence limited to the Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern areas of the country. Under each area SLN had a few establishments and detachments. The SLN had a few off shore petrol Vessels (OPV's), Fast Gun boats, petrol vessels and small crafts. Further SLN had small strength of officers and sailors before (by the year) 1983. The strength and the vessels owned by the SLN sufficed to function the role of the SLN during the period mentioned. With the outbreak of the civil war and the increase of terrorist activities in the Jaffna peninsula, Eastern Area, North central and South Eastern areas of the country, SLN was compelled to increase the strength of Officers and sailors, Establishing of new commands, establishing of new establishments and detachments, acquiring of new ships and crafts capable to face threat posed by the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Further SLN formed the special forces such as Special Boat Squadron (SBS), Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS) and Naval Patrolman Branch (NPM). The above mentioned facts caused increase the of number of Officers and sailors in the other branches and Volunteer Naval force over the sea going officers and sailors. The need of the requirements of infrastructure, logistic and other facilities grew rapidly with the increase of persons and with the swell of the SLN. More than half of the SLN budget was allocated under recurrent expenditure such as pay, allowances, victualing, clothing, fuel and electricity.

After the end of war in the year 2009, the SLN has been assigned with the new tasks of developing of infrastructure for the country. SLN compelled to recruit persons under volunteer special scheme as skilled labourers for the growing demand in the construction sector. Further keeping vacuum in the various branches, considerable number of officers and sailors had been transferred to the various other non-naval duties. Further SLN opened new ventures such as Malima hospitality services to cater the civilian population. The reasons mentioned above caused the growth of the number of officers and the sailors in the Navy.

WHY SLN NEED DOWNSIZING VS RIGHTSIZING:

Currently Sri Lanka falls under the category of developing country. The economy is depending on the grants and loans and mostly foreign employment earnings. The agriculture sector and industrial sectors are not growing as expected. The budget deficit is high. The import expenditure is greater than export income. At the moment country is searching for investors. The government is compelled to increase taxes, obtain loans in order to repay the debts. Sri Lanka is a welfare state and most of the essential services such as education, health care given free of charge to the citizens. Further government is giving certain subsidies to the certain sections such as agriculture and the certain essential commodities.

Government is compelled to run the certain welfare programmes such as Samurdhi to uplift the living standard of the less benefitted people. The number of government employees are high. The large portion of government income has been allocated for the public sector expenditure such as salaries and pension. The more of the development projects completed under loans, the less return is on investment. The income generated by the country is insufficient to cater to the growing demand of the various sectors. The country needs more investment, earn profits from the projects and curtail the expenditure to overcome the current situation. The above mentioned reason clearly explains why do many suggest that the armed forces strength should be reduced since the war is over.

THE AREA NEED TO BE PAID MORE ATTENTION WHEN DOWNSIZING VS RIGHTSIZING OF SLN STRENGTH :

•Re-evaluating the role and the function of the establishments and detachments established during the period of war:

After beginning the battle with the LTTE, SLN was compelled to perform security duties both in the land and the sea. The LTTE dominated the most part of the Northern, Eastern, North Western, North Central and Southeastern areas. Hence SL Army fought with the LTTE for re acquiring of land occupied by them. In the meantime LTTE activities in the sea also increased and they established sea tiger wing to fight against with the SLN. Further SLN was assigned with the task of controlling of land areas recaptured from the LTTE by SL Army. The SLN also acquired new ships and crafts to face the threat posed by the LTTE. At this juncture SLN needed more strength to run the newly established establishments and detachments. The island-wide recruitment drive was carried out for the fulfillment of the requirement of officers and sailors.

This caused establishing more recruit training centers to train newly recruited sailors to the SLN. The development of infrastructure facilities also increased to be par with the increasing of the strength. The strength of technical and non-technical branches was also increased with the enhancement of sea going units, new establishments and the newly established commands.

The establishments and detachments established during the period of war with the LTTE are still maintained in the same phase and running with the full strength of officers and sailors. The past role of the SLN was changed at present when peace was established with the end of the war. Hence SLN has to reevaluate the roles and functions of these establishments / detachments and rightsized the strength of these detachments suited to the present roles or re think about the existence of detachments established during the period of war.

The SLN needs to dominate the sea rather than dominating more land area in future. SLN has to find out the way of dominating coastal area from maintaining surveillance at sea rather than maintaining small detachments along the coast line.

•Minimizing of the recruitment of personnel for the development of infrastructure:

It has been observed that during the war and after the war, skilled labour had been recruited to the SLN exclusively for the development of infrastructure, under Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Special

Scheme. With the end of the war, SLN was assigned with various outside development projects. The growing demand of skill persons for the construction projects, SLN was compelled to recruit skilled labour for the construction field in a short span of time. This also affected the enhancement of administrative duties; welfare activities and development of infrastructure of the SLN to cater to the needs of these sailors.

Considerable numbers of sailors are still assigned for the administrative and other matters connected to the volunteer special scheme sailors. Hence SLN has to minimize the involvement in the outside construction field. This is not the prime role of the SLN. SLN need to minimize the recruiting of skilled labour to the construction field in future and right size the current work force by keeping sufficient number of sailors for the maintenance. SLN has to seek possibility of outsourcing the construction of buildings to the reputed organizations and minimizing the use of direct labour.

•Ventures owned by SLN:

After establishing peace in the country SLN established the various ventures such as hospitality services for civilians, agriculture and various other projects. Considerable number of officers and sailors involved in these ventures and Officers and sailors are newly recruited exclusively for these ventures under volunteer and volunteer special scheme. Since most of the hospitality services owned by SLN converted to the holiday bungalows at present, it is time to reduce the strength of these ventures and keep minimum strength for maintenance and operational activities.

•Minimizing the number of training centers:

The recruit training centers were established in various parts of the country to cater to the growing demand of the training of the sailors in the past. These recruit training centers are still run with full strength of officers and sailors. If SLN thinks of minimizing the recruitment in future, SLN has to rethink of existence of some training centers or reduce the strength.

•Role and the task of SLN fleet:

The war with the LTTE is unconventional and SLN has to counter the threat posed by the enemy. Hence SLN was procured more fast attack crafts, fast gun boats, landing ship tanks and produce various small crafts in house to counter the threat of the enemy and over power the enemy at sea. These craft are provided with modern technology and had great fire power.

With the end of the war it has been observed that at present role of the fast attack craft are gradually diminishing and the role of the offshore petrol vessels(OPV's) gradually increased due to more surveillance activities at sea. SLN intends to procure new OPV's with grater endurance at sea from various countries in near future. However SLN is maintaining same inventory of vessels existed at past with full strength of officers and sailors. This is high time to re evaluate the current role and the future role of the Navy and phase out some ships and craft in the inventory or maintain these craft with minimum strength. SLN can utilize excess strength of these crafts for ships intend to be acquired in the future.

•Utilizing modern technology for the security duties:

The security points, bunkers had been established in every base after evaluating the threat posed by the enemy at past. These points are manned by the officers and sailors. Now SLN can rethink about the pattern of employing men for the security duties in establishments and utilizing modern technology instead of utilizing man power.

•Role and task of the Special Forces and land forces:

Re-evaluating the task and the role of the land forces and the Special Forces and utilizing of them efficiently and effectively.

• **Attaching Naval personnel for government organization for the non-naval duties:**

It has been observed that quite a number of officers and sailors have been attached to the various government organizations for non-naval duties. These officers and sailors are paid and fed by the SLN and they are included in the present cadre of the SLN. This caused SLN to recruit more officers and sailors to fulfill the vacuum. Hence SLN need to minimize or cease releasing of officers and sailors for such outside duties in future.

• **Minimizing recruitment of men and women exclusively for the sports pools:**

It has been observed that in the past officers and sailors of the Regular Force and officers and sailors of the Volunteer Force in active service on duty take part in the sport activities and those who excel in certain sports included to the sport pools. In the recent past, a large number of men and women recruited to the sport pools under volunteer special scheme entailed in reducing/decrease of number of officers and sailors of the regular and volunteer force. Hence SLN needs to promote the sport activities among the regular and volunteer force officers and sailors in active service and minimize the number of volunteer special scheme personnel in the sport pools.

• **Possibility of employing more naval personnel for the United Nations (UN) peace keeping duties:**

Currently Bangladesh Navy is the regional navy which has been able to attach more naval personnel and some of their ships and assets to the UN peacekeeping duties. Bangladesh Navy has lesser number of naval personnel when compared with the SLN. Hence SLN has to seek possibility of attaching more naval personnel and ships to the UN peacekeeping duties. It is benefited to the SLN as well as to the country.

• **The role played by the Sri Lanka Coast Guard in the future:**

The Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG) is currently performing duties under SLN. The SLCG can play a major role at sea, if SLCG can be expanded in future with a proper plan. SLN can contribute to the expansion of SLCG in the future providing personnel, ships and craft and necessary assistance.

Conclusion:

Right sizing of the SLN is not the reducing number of officers and sailors of each branch. It will weaken the SLN if SLN haphazardly reduces the strength. Hence the downsizing is not the solution for SLN. SLN has to study the frontline Navy's and regional Navies larger than our navy not from the strength but from the inventory of ships they have, land mass of the respective countries, sea area they are controlling and occupying, how they are minimizing the establishment of bases, employment of men and material for the security duties. SLN has to find out the logic behind the employment of men and material by these Navies and how they run with minimum force with large inventory of vessels. Further the coastal line and the land mass of these countries are greater than that of Sri Lanka.

Acquiring of more lands to the SLN and maintaining in the past under various commands and the establishments, diversified the various non naval fields which can easily be taken over by civilian society created the current strength. If SLN is diversified to the non-naval roles forgetting main role of the Navy, it may create a precedence in the Navy and it will badly affect the function of the main role. The major role of the SLN is maintaining of territorial integrity of the country. It includes surveillance at sea, aid to civil power and protect the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The shape and the size of the Sri Lanka Navy's future depends on the future role going to be played by the navy at sea.

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LOOKING BEYOND THE HORIZON: THE NECESSITY OF TRAINING, EDUCATING AND NURTURING SLN OFFICERS

Commander (G) SP Kaththirarachchi

Introduction:

In the age of the 4th Generation Warfare which is characterized by blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and civilians; deferring consideration on serious change in the modus operandi of the armed forces impose a great deal of strain on their officer cadre vis-à-vis the subordinate men they command. The next, perhaps more compelling reason, is that an era of increasing change, unpredictability, and growing complexity is already upon us. An era in which navies find themselves engaged in combat which is largely getting asymmetric, on humanitarian relief missions, joint training with foreign militaries or hunting pirates demands a new system of training or at least an improvement of the existing one, along with prudent and transparent assessment and promotion system that can produce leaders nimble enough to take on such varied challenges. Hence, we can never rule out the fact that SLN Officer Cadre of tomorrow will not be confronted with these realities.

The need is clear for a model that trains, educates and nurtures officers for complex interactions in current threat environments, and to promote those who demonstrate the ability to adapt swiftly to complexity and ambiguity. The navy's capacity to carry out the missions assigned to it in the 21st Century operating environment is inseparable from the effectiveness of the Training, Education and Nurturing it provides to its personnel, especially its Officer Cadre. But the solution can't be as simple as adding even more to the already-packed training and professional naval education curriculum for junior (tactical), intermediate (operational) and senior (strategic) officers.

The SLN must make an earnest effort to develop a model that trains and educates officers for the complex interactions of the current threat environment while being agile and versatile enough to adapt to a swiftly changing world beyond. The navy must also be agile enough to change its personnel policies, its promotion procedures, and even its vision of itself in order to attract and retain the people it needs to lead the navy in this new era. Hence, the Officer cadre is "at the forefront of an ever-increasing array of challenges" a third-world maritime nation faces and that the navy "must prepare itself better for the inevitability of such challenges." With the wealth of experience gathered for virtually 22 year long voyage in the Sri Lanka Navy and also with all experience I have gained so far interacting with the other sister services and our foreign counterparts, I have observed the importance of making Military like "an Officer and a Gentleman – of par excellence", right from the very beginning of an Officer's career; before it's too late. Thus my focus on this matter includes the vision of making 'The 21st Century Naval Officer' with regard to the following time periods of an Officer's Life;

- a. Officer Enlistment
- b. Basic Training
- c. On the Job Training
- d. Advanced Training
- e. Career Development

But before we move on to the above topics it is imperative to have an overview of the evolution of the military culture what a Service Officer inherits, and understand what an Officer is expected to be in such culture.

Officers' Enlistment:

It is reasonably apprehended that one of the biggest issues faced by the SLN is the attraction of suitable "potential officers" from the different socio-economic rungs of the society without compromising the service standards and the requirements. It has been observed that in any nation, especially, in the developing countries where there is a huge social imbalance accompanied with adverse social recognition for the Armed Services, and the volatility of security situations, the attraction of the "fitting" youth to the armed forces has ever been a critical issue for the administrators of the National Security Forces. Most of today's youth may not be eligible for military service for various reasons such as being too naïve, lethargic, fat, weak, or altogether not smart enough and prone to drug-use and criminal behaviour.

Being physically fit is the top priority in the conversion from civilian life to becoming an officer in the navy. Potential candidates must pass a physical test to see if they are ready for the challenges of basic training. The candidates will be given an initial test to see if they can pass the physical training screening. Most of them have more trouble with the running because coming from the civilian life, most never train to run on their own. It is important to pass these physical training screenings because when they enter basic training, the Physical Training Instructors and Drill Instructors will prepare them by getting them on the "military treadmill" where speed is determined by the instructors themselves.

To be an officer in the navy having the required "brawns" is not merely enough. Thus "brains" are equally or even more important. Thus, all prospective candidates must be thoroughly tested in mental aptitude, general knowledge, and linguistic skills and for physiological soundness. Fine social attributes as I believe is equally imperative being a naval officer where emphasis is given to possess adequate socialising qualities to be an emphatic officer in the profession of arms.

It's quite true if one says that the quality of the "harvest" you expect strongly resembles the quality of the "seeds" you sowed. It is apparent in such circumstances in the developing nations that only the middle class educated youth are inclined to join the Armed Services as Officers and the lower classes are compelled to join the same as Other Ranks/Ratings for the reasons of their substandard educational, economic and social conditions, if not to merely find a living. However, the luckier lot of the lower social levels with bare minimum requirements are also inclined to grab the opportunity of joining the armed forces as officers. Hence, it is clear that even though the selection to military services are modelled on very rigorous and meticulous criteria on aspects of both physical and mental capacities the selected group represents all walks of life in the society in varying proportions (which I feel very democratically motley) thus giving rise to so many differences in attitude, behaviour and response complicating the mentors task of indoctrination of military training and ideologies effectively and equally among them.

The main issue, as I have perceived, for not being able to attract the best youth for candidacy is the failure to set the right imprint about the image of the Navy in the minds of the youths in the society by means of media propaganda, emphatic public appearances (the US Navy's flight demonstration squadron, with aviators from the Navy and Marines - "Blue Angels" make some of their selected pilots to appear in public in Schools and elsewhere in full uniform periodically to inspire the best youth to join them), effective awareness programs, reviewing of naval uniforms, insignia, welfare and remunerations in toto to be more competitively lucrative.

Basic Training:

There is nothing more important to an officer's future than well-composed Basic Training. Basic Training sets the tone of the service and establishes the standards that officers will follow throughout their careers. The navy must start by training the new cadets to the highest standards. Basic Training is the first step in the process of learning which spells out the alphabet of the service regulations, traditions, customs and ethos and all what it means to be an officer in the navy.

The conversion from a civilian life to a military life (Re-socialization) will potentially be the most difficult and rewarding experience of a person's life. The development to becoming a soldier consists of becoming physically fit, self-confident, and willing and able to tackle anything that comes his/her way with a sheer stoic attitude.

A leading expert in military training methods, Grossman (2001) gives four types of training techniques used:

- a. Brutalization
- b. Classical Conditioning
- c. Operant Conditioning
- d. Role Modeling

According to Grossman (2001), these techniques aimed to break down barriers to embrace a new set of norms and way of life (brutalization), condition trainees to pair killing with something more enjoyable and pleasurable (classical conditioning), repeat the stimulus-response reaction to develop a reflex (operant conditioning), and finally utilise a role model of a superior to provide action by example (emulation).

It is imperative to note that officers are trained as a batch at the inception not as individuals. Therefore, the nurturing must be such that will enable to cater for the differences of the backgrounds the Officer Trainees are coming from. This point in consideration applies to all levels of training in their career in varying degrees. The military leadership depends upon unqualified obedience and amenability of the subordinates, which, as it is widely accepted, must be commanded not demanded. Therefore, the officers must be competent, reliable and much knowledgeable about their men, equipment and the operations they are called upon to handle and equally acquainted with general aspects of life; for the men they command to give a voluntary subordination by inspiration. They must feel proud about self as a member of the Profession of Arms which is a noble service than a paid job.

During basic training, apart from teaching the basic dos and don'ts there are other important aspects an officer trainee must be taught or rather indoctrinated with. To the dismay and contempt of the true and honest admirers of the service code of conduct and the mores associated with it, it has been observed that many officers, during certain points of time in their career, tend to be very obsequious, unreasonably insular and parsimonious, disenchanting, capricious, cynical of the system and recalcitrant in behaviour which are deleterious to the existence and advancement of the standards of a world class profession of arms which we have inherited from our predecessors and are unquestionably bound to preserve and pass down the line for many a generation to come. Such qualities must be identified and extinguished at the incipient stage.

The officers must be taught of good "sportsmanship" (fair game) and be made to think modestly in victory yet recover fast in defeat. Besides being a good sportsman (mandatory) he should of course be able to comprehend the social customs and etiquettes (manners) of a civilized society, and acquire as much skills as possible in Art and special non-combatant skills e.g.: music, dancing, drawing, culinary, and driving/riding etc... mainly to avoid being seen ignorant of social culture and also to stand with confidence among others. Importance of language training or at least, awareness earlier in an Officer's career, or even before careers really begin is greatly emphasized, as Field Marshal Viscount Slim noted "wisdom without eloquence is of little use".

In most Officer Training Academies all basic individual and most squad-level training is directed by sailor instructors, to the standards set by the Officers in Charge of training. Young Officers are principally responsible only for the moral component of the trainees under their command. Their involvement in training is limited to authorizing exercises and safety standards, not much for the conduct or the standard of the training itself, which are mainly the purview of the former. This tends to produce repetitive, unimaginative, and risk-averse training, heavily tied to formatted training objectives, as well as further limiting opportunities for young Officers to develop their own training and leadership skills.

One important aspect we have to bear in our minds as trainers is that the life of an Officer at basic training acts as the foundation of such individual as in a building where stronger and systematic the foundation is – stronger and taller the building which can be erected upon.

On The Job Training:

This is particularly aimed to impart practical knowledge on the subject matters the officers are entrusted with and to gain a realistic understanding of the behaviour of men and machinery they will be entrusted to handle and also a futuristic insight into their own adaptability to different working environments according to their branches where even the present day simulation training falls far short of such. Every officer must be given a fair opportunity to work on the job and improve and show his potential and more importantly to prove him in reality. The advances in technology demand every officer to get a reasonable prowess and acquaintance with regard to such. The responsibilities of Junior Officers will continue to expand beyond the bounds of their traditional foundational skill sets and Officers at all ranks will increasingly confront wicked or ill-structured problems, confounded by incomplete information and with such a vast array of implications that traditional decision making models will no longer apply.

It is better to prepare Junior Officers for broadening responsibilities by deliberately expanding their experience base prior to commissioning by enhancing the inculcation of critical thinking skills across the officer cadre by extending teaching environments beyond the academies and increasing efforts to develop “supporting” skill sets. The hierarchy’s understanding of what young officers already bring into the service is precluded by lack of interaction across the ranks and it should be enhanced by increasing the vertical interactions and interoperability of different branches and by collecting additional information about such officers’ existing knowledge, skills, and abilities. There must be increased early opportunities for earlier joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational experience for budding officers, which would reflect the on-the-ground realities the officers have dealt with over the past decades.

Advanced Training:

The diversity of missions over the last three decades, while not unprecedented, has been relatively sudden in its onset and has taken place within a compressed time period. As such, it has proven challenging culturally, materially, organizationally, and doctrinally. Thus advanced training for officers to do overseas and joint training is highly necessary to understand the global trends in warfare. Direct competency measures such as tests that indicate levels of creativity and communications skills ideally would contribute to judgments about assignments and development. Also there is a growing need to enhance communication skills so that officers have the ability to compete in the “battle of the narrative ... understanding that their role in this endeavour may be as important to the success or failure of state policy as is their skill with executing combined arms operations against the enemy. One of the major challenges the SLN faces today is to change the current trend towards a growing gap in ingenuity; a quality conspicuous in the personality of legendary Admiral Lord Nelson who was noted for his inspirational leadership and having a superb grasp of strategy and unconventional tactics, which resulted in a number of decisive naval victories, a trend in which the need for creative approaches grows and the systems we expect to foster and encourage those approaches become increasingly out dated and insufficient. This gap will only increase if our current practices persist especially with the undesirable whims and bigotry in the higher strata.

Career Development:

The Navy must not hesitate to understand the critical impact the current out-of-date force structure and personnel management system have on the morale and expectations of the Junior Officers. It presently takes 10+ years to “groom” an officer to be a Lieutenant Commander (middle level) by then he will have passed half-time of his retirement eligible service. As the navy continues to transform and maintain a significant potential in carrying out its classic primary role and other missions which underpin the ever increasingly diversified national requirements it is imperative to impart Mid-career Training is not done to standard and

organised manner, leader development in operational assignments is limited and does not meet officers' expectations where officers and their families unable to realise whether their future is heading elect to leave the service early. At present, the focus for change is at the level of doctrine, training, and force development; but this is largely dependent on the personalities and commitment of individuals. Nonetheless, the naval hierarchy is with the mentality so influenced by the technological advances, while having less understanding of the human dimension of combat or service effectiveness. Therefore, it is healthy to put the existing management system under prudent review and reshape them best fitting to the requirements without prejudicing the naval customs, time, tide and tradition.

This new system of Officer Career Development should include periodic professional education and allow for increased use of no-penalty sabbatical years for outside study. Importance of sabbaticals can be viewed as encouraging the accession and retention of the best available talent which will optimistically offer more diverse and flexible career paths that encourage risk-taking and unconventional assignments. Increased use of sabbatical years particularly to pursue higher education or gain additional experience in an unconventional assignment would provide additional career flexibility for future generations of officers who will not be satisfied with the military's current Industrial Age autocratic personnel management.

The Officer Management System should comprise the laws, policies, procedures, and practices that guide how officers enter service and are subsequently developed, promoted, and retired. Current, promotion criteria favour some attributes that are relatively less useful than they were during the War era, while neglecting to reward those of greatest importance in the emerging national security climate. Subjective assessments and personal affiliations often determine who gets promoted into the senior ranks where individual's genuine intellectual capacities added with true and honest commitment towards preservation of service ethos are pushed to the back seat resulting in "some lucky Artful Dodgers" being reaping most of the perks and privileges and getting promoted to positions of strategic leadership for which they are often poorly suited by temperament, ability, or training and education. Selection for special mid-career courses must be done with adequate transparency and fairness.

No laws or regulations governing such should be made in retrospective effect once an officer becomes eligible for consideration for such courses. It is highly demoralizing for someone to be penalized by a regulation which had not been in effect at the time the officer matures in his career to undergo such training. Repetitive selection of the same officers for such depriving the others of a fair chance is also very unhealthy. The selectors must have a better understanding to evaluate the officers in light of the seniority and capability along with the entire career progress and projected future of the individual officer concerned. Future selection boards for promotions will need clear instructions to properly assess those holistic attributes in candidates for promotion that will be most valuable for anticipated future assignments, and they should be chaired by senior officers cognizant of their responsibility to shape the future force to prepare for and meet those demands.

To preclude development of a resulting ingenuity gap, the military services must enlarge the aperture on what is considered relevant experience and expertise. They must fundamentally shift the basis for promotion eligibility from a system focused on time (in service or in grade) to one predicated on competencies, achievements or broad sets of interrelated knowledge, skills, and abilities in a given area.

Good command in English language must be made mandatory for promotions to ranks above Commander. They must be educated enough to be in par with their civilian counterparts in many aspects rather than being backward and avoiding such confrontation timidly and cowardly. An officer who claims to be the bravest and the cleverest in battle is of little use to his Service and the men who look up to him if found incompetent to deal well with the civilian society.

Conclusion:

In developed nations, the increasing emphasis on technological firepower and better-trained fighting forces, the increasing unlikelihood of conventional warfare, as well as memories and lessons learnt of the contentiousness of the Past War experience, make services to revamp their force structures and systems for future. Therefore, luring the talented youths to the armed forces has ever become a growing concern for the present administrators of such. Thus the requirement of making good officers entails all such as the term Nurturing means; to take care of, feed, protect and help them grow. The military must aim to produce future leaders with a "higher level of doctrine-based skills, knowledge, attitudes, and experience with a sound understanding of the world outside the service perimeters. Trying to make every officer a jack of all trades means that every officer will be a master of none. Instead, the SLN should develop an appropriate balanced distribution of talents across required knowledge areas within segments of the services' Officers through more differentiated career paths. If SLN expects its Officers to continue to excel, the future demands new approaches. But beyond these particular concerns lies a more fundamental issue: the growing divergence between an increasingly dynamic future and an out dated Officer Evaluation System (NAV 206) optimized for static conditions.

There must be a clear plan to retire officers with blurred career prospects paving way to younger, better educated, professionally competent officers. Older Officers, including many with service extensions and those close to 55 years of age should be offered generous retirement packages as inducements to retire, if not the "bottle neck" condition will persist and the top will be full of strategic thinkers whose thinking will be quite obsolete from the reality. In reality we know that we cannot make a "universal officer" yet we can make them to be adaptive to think "universally" as it is the prime aim of any form of education today where the world is closing in than ever before. Modern day Officers must be "renaissance" leaders in this global context where they are able to "serve the motherland with dignity and honour". They should be able to speak on any topic in the current world and talk in any forum with ease without being seen the "odd" one. I strongly believe in the fact that "Men" mean more than guns in the rating of a ship. Our victory (success) or defeat (failure) is based on skills, talents and attitude of our people – the comrades in arms.

Last but not the least, each individual must be made realize that the SLN is bound to serve the country and its people when called upon to risk their lives for the betterment of the others both in manmade and natural calamities. Hence, "serving in the country's naval arm" is a noble service than a just another "paid job" as most civilians might see it. The nobleness, of course, to the most extent, lies in the hands of the officers who are in charge and it is incumbent on them to show that to the people of Sri Lanka who have accepted them to be their guardians or as the "front line defenders of the nation". As Naval Officers we shall never betray the country and its people to the enemy or any third party for whatever the reason and will fight for the glory and honour of the country we serve because we all are aware that in the end we all have to leave the service but dignity and honour have no price.

DOWNSIZING vs RIGHTSIZING : SRI LANKA NAVY FUTURE FORCE

Commander(S) PDD Dewappriya

No military or naval force, in war, can accomplish anything worthwhile unless there is at the back of it, the work of an efficient, loyal and devoted staff.

Lt Gen Hunter Liggett, United State America (1857 - 1935)

Introduction:

The Human Resource is the most valuable asset in any organization. The largeness of its operations, size of the organization and the operation reach are decided by the number of its employees. However the right size or the number of employees in an organization is always a question for the management. Regardless of military or civil, the organizations are gradually improving its capacity of operations. Similarly the "Hiring" and "Firing" of the employees also take place. But is it that much simple in military? Recruitment, training and development of a military person consume lengthy time and assets too. It is a costly affair for any nation. Similarly how good is it to release a hard trained battle hardened soldier to society without rehabilitating? The social impact and the positive and negative impact have not been properly researched in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan defence forces had fought a fierce battle against LTTE terrorists more than 30 years.

To face the enemies and protect citizen of Sri Lanka from the cruelty of terrorism, the Sri Lankan military had to use its all potentials against the LTTE. In this situation Sri Lanka Navy too increased its force largely by recruiting more and more personnel and used them in many diversified tasks. In 2009, Sri Lanka Military made the world history by defeating terrorism by means of military action. Since then the right sizing or downsizing of its force became a contemporary topic in many defence forums. However this process is not a single handed, the military leaders, politicians, civilian opinion, threat assessment, budget and economy are all should involved.

•The Size and Structural Paradox of SLN:

The active military cadre of SLN is currently exceeds the number that the organization actually needs. In other way the number of ships and craft belong to SLN is very minimum and old. According to the global fire power ranking 2016, the Sri Lanka military has been ranked 84th position whilst India is in 4th, Pakistan in 13th, Bangladesh in 52nd and Afghanistan is ranked as 66th position. Above rankings focused on weapon diversity with geographical factors and available manpower. Hence this ranking really indicates the lack of platforms and modernized systems rather than manpower. The military modernization over last half decades has been impressive in Asian region. Further geopolitical environment in South Asia and the strategic concerns of most of the states in South Asia have been linked to their strategic concerns related to development of armed forces.

But, what is the size of military or up to what degree the country should modernize her military is a burning question for a medium - income and developing nation like Sri Lanka. There are many concerns like infrastructure development; education development, health improvement and economic development which are lucrative and attractive for national decision makers. Of cause, the biggest challenge for the Navy is to contest in this and best address as the maritime interests of the Island nation is appearing to be increasingly linked to the economic and other state mechanisms. Followings are few facts one would like to pay his attention on.


	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India
Total Population	22 Million	168 Million	199 Million	1,251.6 Million
Total Naval Strength	40 No Frigates, Destroyers, Corvettes or Sub Marines	89 Frigates- 6 Corvettes- 4 Mine sweepers -5	197 Frigates- 10 Sub Marines- 5 Mine sweepers -3	295 Air Craft Carriers -2 Frigates- 14 Destroyers -10 Corvettes -26 Sub Marines- 14
Coastal Defence Craft	70	37	12	135
Square Land Area	65,610 Km	143,998 Km	796,095 Km	3,287,263 Km
Coastline	Coastline 1,340 Km	580 Km	1,046 Km	7,000 Km
Manpower	55,280	16,900	30,700	58,350
Defence Budget	USD 1,500M	USD 1,590M	USD 7,000M	USD 40,000M

Source: Global Fire power ranking 2016

Does SLN contesting with rational cause? The factors listed above are alarming our planners and military strategists, about the SLN manpower vs platform ratio comparing with the regional navies. Pakistan who is having a coastal line of 1046 KM is having 30700 men and 10 capital ships, in the meantime Sri Lanka is having 55000 men and no capital ships to protect her 1340 km coastal line. Further the limited budget allocated to SLN largely consumes recurrent expenses, mainly because of maintaining a large workforce. The primary data collected about total budget allotment for Recurrent vs Capital is given below.

ANNUAL BUDGET OF SLN (RS IN MILLION)

YEAR	RECURRENT ALLO- CATION	CAPITAL ALLOCA- TION	TOTAL
2007	16,390.08	10,965.00	27,355.08
2008	19,174.00	8,000.00	27,174.00
2009	25,382.00	5,414.41	30,797.38
2010	25,334.00	5,414.41	30,748.41
2011	32,722.92	9,218.74	41,941.66
2012	33,208.49	4,796.86	38,005.35
2013	38,556.02	4,778.50	43,334.52
2014	48,189.95	5,710.66	53,900.61
2015	48,187.80	9,854.58	58,042.38
2016	48,470.19	13,123.99	61,594.18




Source: Primary data from Naval Budget Directorate:

The portion allotted for personnel emolument is more than 60% of the recurrent budget. This is purely allocated to settle monthly wages of the officers and sailors. This situation is by and large hampering the development of force by technology. Following details are relevant to the SLN recurrent allocation.

RECURRANT BUDGET ALLOCATION (RS IN MILLION)

YEAR	PAY AND ALLOW- ANCE	OTHER	TOTAL REC ALLO- CATION
2007	9,383.00	7,007.08	16,390.08
2008	10,536.00	8,638.00	19,174.00
2009	16,742.85	8,640.12	25,382.97
2010	18,312.00	7,022.00	25,334.00
2011	21,735.69	10,987.23	32,722.92
2012	23,746.49	9,462.00	33,208.49
2013	26,413.82	12,142.20	38,556.02
2014	27,907.00	20,282.95	48,189.95
2015	34,779.00	13,408.80	48,187.80
2016	36,067.39	12,402.80	48,470.19



Source: Primary data from Naval Budget Directorate

Navies all over the world are developing themselves by acquiring better technologies and platforms. The radar systems, EODs, sensors, weapon systems and missile systems are technically improving day by day. Most of the old systems are obsolescing and new hi-tech systems are replacing them. Similarly the number of men onboard also shrinks relatively. This trend has not been correctly noticed by SLN strategic planners. Further role and task of the SLN too shifted in post war period.

During the conflict period the operational requirement demanded large amount of manpower as the enemy's clandestine operations were detrimental to the military as well as civilians. Hence in lining with national requirements SLN had to focus on civilians' security, defending military camps and safeguarding the liberated areas from LTTE and defending impotent places like ports, major supply routes (MSRs) etc. This trend demanded SLN to perform land operation role as a result SLN developed the Patrolman Branch and Volunteer Cadre to meet such demands.

Demand for Blue Water Navy:

The world has never witnessed a fierce insurgency similar to LTTE ever before. As mentioned above, the role played by the SLN before 2009 was different. The post war role and tasks demanded by the nation and world from SLN is becoming more complicated due to various geopolitical issues. Because of that the special emphasis will not be required to understand the importance of developing the capacity and capability of the navy to be in line with the future naval role and tasks. The future role of the SL Navy will be largely based upon the geographical location of the country and the connectivity to the global maritime trade network. The waters around the country are full of commercial and other activities and which are demanding considerable involvement of the SLN.

Hence it is very important to focus towards the future challenges and threats when defining the post war role of the SLN. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to which Sri Lanka (SL) belongs, is an area of paramount importance for the world. The maritime threats like terrorism, piracy, illegal human smuggling among Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Australia, arms smuggling, IUU fishing at our maritime zones, drug trafficking across the coastal waters are generating an inescapable responsibility towards involvement in constabulary role in IOR. Further, vibrant economic actions taking place in Indian Ocean (IO), maintenance of SLOCs, prevention of maritime pollution, disaster management in maritime context and SAR operations to rescue civilians from maritime crisis too demand greater involvement of SLN in international maritime activities.

This is an irresistible offer for the SLN from international. This is further signified by the prominence given and invitations extended to the SLN in forums like Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and Galle Dialogue. Further the joint operation trainings extended by India (SLINEX), Maldives (DOSTI), Singapore (INDEX), Indonesia (KOMODO MENEK) Malaysia (LIMA) and Pakistan (AMMAN) also demand for a more professional navy in the future. The states like Australia, China, France, India, United States, Japan, and Russia are increasing their naval presence in SL and creating paradoxical security dilemma. In the middle of these heterogeneous conditions, SLN could not be substandard and certainly the SL military strategist would have to optimistically understand the importance of SLN upgrade to Blue Water Navy.

Further, safeguarding of large water space in South, Southeast and Southwest of Sri Lanka or providing a timely assistance to victims at sea as and when requested will be a challenging task for a brown water navy like current Sri Lanka Navy. The available few platforms like OPVs, Gun Boats and FACs are highly insufficient for the present and future role. Hence the naval arm of SL has to be developed as a blue water navy with no delay. This demand is unable to adjourn further more. Further, this was clearly understood by the SL Navy and modernization plan was published in "Sri Lanka Military in 2025, Joint modernization plan -2025 (Naval Component)". This road map towards SLN-2025 defines the shape of the SLN in future. But the current unnecessarily bulked manpower should be sorted out meticulously in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the SLN's in future maritime role. The propagation of SLN cadre over the period is mentioned below.

SLN Cadre propagation

YEAR	2000	2010	2016
FORCE SIZE	19230	50429	55290

Source : primary data from Naval Personal Directorate

SLN Total Complement 2016

TYPE	OFFICERS	SALIORS
Regular	2549	39752
Volunteer	392	12119
RNR	18	327
VNR	7	127

Source : Primary data from the Naval Personal Directorate

Regular sailors composition

Type	Count
Seaman	12180
Technical	6260
Logistics	5102
Others	15591
Artificers	946

Source : Primary data from Naval Personal Directorate

The Above data shows how SLN has developed the force size over last one and half decades. SLN had increased the cadre size by 162 percent from year 2000 to 2010. In the year 2000 it was 19230 and by 2016 the total manpower is 55290. Further, the count of Seamen in the Navy is 12180. However the actual sea going strength, including technological and other branches is 4858 and it is 12 percent from the total regular force. The balance of 35221 regular cadres and 12119 volunteer cadres, amounting to 47340 personnel purely engaged in supportive role. In the meantime the main concern is 7818 from supportive cadre, which includes VAS and VSS sailors who work as sportsman and construction field labourers. Does SLN need to have these large numbers of masons, carpenters, welders, plumbers and sports pool persons? It is really a timely research what Navy has to do immediately and understand pros and cons. Creating an own model and developing the Navy is strategically important for any nation.

But it is similarly important to be based on a true logic, as most of other navies are shifting to outsourcing. In contrast to many other navies like Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Singapore, very minimum uniform staff of SLN performs the prime role of the navy and majority engages in repairs and logistics. But most of the advanced navies and the regional supper navies mentioned above, utilize civilians and ex uniform (retired) staff for all supportive activities even for providing food and lodging. In the meantime the South Asian Navies like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the majority of the workforce is engaged in the main role and very limited uniform staff is engaged in the supportive roles. Comparing all above factors it is highly felt that SLN has not managed the workforce in an optimum way and it is wasting a considerable allocation from defence budget to maintain overly bulked manpower.

Downsizing or Rightsizing:

The reduction of forces is an old and straight forward terminology used in HR management. But it is simply a layoff action to terminate the jobs. The Rightsizing or Downsizing is more new addition to the HR terminology which ultimately results to lean the organization. The size of organization and its force level are decided based on the role and task assigned to the organization. However the latest development in SL military environment demanded for a lean but modernized military structure for the country. In doing so lying off will not happen an accident and is not a debatable question, considering the present transformation of the Sri Lanka Navy. Knowing probably where SLN should head to, the downsizing or rightsizing has to be a timely decision. But according to HR scholars the downsizing is so reactive, depressing, disrupting, nonproductive and impersonal process.

The downsizing takes place in corporate sector as a result of departmental consolidation, plant or office closure or to reduce payroll expenses. Slowed down economy, merging with other companies or competitors grabbing a higher portion of market share are main reasons of downsizing. Meantime rightsizing is so proactive, future - oriented, creative, strategic and positive process. It is just adjusting the manpower of the organization to the correct size. Further rightsizing is an ongoing process and downsizing is a specific action reacting to a particular cause¹. Hence it is more appropriate to use correct terminology in this transitional period. The rightsizing is more appropriate for SLN restructuring process. The military strategist in SLN has to develop a man to machine (ship) ratio (**Teeth – to Tail Ratio**) and then think about the reducing surplus manpower while creating opportunities for people to leave. This is essential to develop optimal substance model for reforming action. Anyway the future retiring schedule (expecting everyone retiring after 22 years) and recruitment plan of SLN automatically downsizes the manpower. Recruitment plan and evaporation plan up to 2020 is as follows;

year	Evaporation	Recruitment
2017	653	900
2018	1990	1200
2019	2483	1500
2020	1451	1500

Source: primary data from Directorate of Personal

However this evaporation does not answer to the existing situation as the evaporation does not take place in the size demanded. Therefore sustainable and dynamic plan should be worked out to create rightly sized and more lucrative navy to meet future challenges. The decision makers of SLN have to find solutions to the following questions when thinking about their rightsizing plans.

- a. What are the social implications of possible layoff?
- b. Will transformation lead to major changes in the Navy?
- c. Are there any budget cuts with restructuring?
- d. How would cutting the active duty personnel limiting SLN capabilities and capacities?
- e. What is the compensation plan for the fired persons?

There are examples available in the world history. Massive demobilization was taken place in US after World War Again after Vietnam War ². US again downsized the force level after Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Further at the height of Kargill War and Operation Parakram, Indian military has mobilized active military and subsequently demobilized its troops after regaining the control ³. Similarly United Kingdom too downsized its force levels due to budget cuts during the tenure of Prime Minister David Cameron. Hence rightsizing is not inappropriate action as the war demands mobilization to takes place and similarly as the war ends demobilization to take place. The only question is to which magnitude the downsize should be?

Conclusion:

The dilapidated ship is moving with 55000 men onboard in choppy sea. Sustainability and survivability will no longer exist with large people onboard. It is really a tough decision for the captain to make as who will remain onboard. However there is no doubt that the captain has to lay off people for the survivability of majority onboard. SLN today is functioning with overly bulked workforce and very old fleet of ships to meet her expanded role and task. Further out of 55000 people only 4800 go to sea and balance 50000 is doing a supportive role. The 60 percent of allocated funds utilized to settle monthly salary, leaving less than 40 percent to buy ships and weapons. This is an alarming situation for the military strategists of Sri Lanka.

Meanwhile the security imperatives and geographical environment in IO demand more professional approach from the SLN. The seas around SL must be immune to conventional and none conventional threats. Similarly there are more tasks to be performed to ensure national security. The capacity and capabilities and operational procedures followed by SLN during the conflict are not compatible for her new role and tasks. The SLN has to streamline and modernize her force by eliminating large number of old ships and replacing them with fewer, modern units and empower with rightly sized manpower. Actually the need is to dedicate more officers and sailors to the real role of SLN. The size of her major surface combatant fleet has to be relatively stable and modernized to increase interoperability among regional and extra regional players operating in IOR.

However it is a tremendous challenge for today's military leaders of Sri Lanka Navy to evaluate the complexities of the options and take the correct decision to rightsizing dilemma. Modernizing SLN fleet and rightsizing her force size is a manoeuver to face rapidly changing challenges. Having an obese organization leads for mismatch and slower the progress of SLN. How costlier or how tiring this process is, SLN desperately needs the rightsizing. In the meantime, acquisition of latest technologies and state of art ships for her fleet also a timely need for SLN in he-r long run.

2. Garry L Thompson, Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam and Comparison to recent Army downsizing, 2002.pp 2-5

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CONSTRUCTION OF KRA CANAL AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Lcdr (ND) Rasika Amarasinghe

*"Limitless and immortal, the waters are the beginning and end of all things on the earth."
- Loren Eiseley, American Anthropologist*

Kra Canal, Kra Isthmus or Thai canal is planned to be constructed across the South Thailand by connecting the South China Sea and the Andaman Sea. This was a dream of Thai king Narai and French engineer De Lamar Who requested in 1677 to build a waterway across the Southern Thailand. But it couldn't be realized due to the lack of in technology. Younger brother of king Chulalongkorn again tried to build this canal in 1793. Even British had the intention of constructing this canal and, the constructor of Suez Canal Ferdinand de Lesseps also visited to inspect the site in 1882. Finally, the Royal crown decided in 1897 to develop Singapore as a shipping hub rather than digging the Kra Canal. Present project was proposed by Chow Chowkwanyun of Thailand in 1971. As the owner of Thai Oil Public Company Limited (TOC), he had to afford a considerable amount for oil shipments due to the distance from South China Sea to Indian Ocean or vis-a-vis across the Malacca Strait. Therefore, this project was proposed with the intention of shortening the travelling time, reducing the expenses and generating an additional income to the Thai Government.

However, Thai Government was not able to recognise the importance of this proposal at that time and, did not put the required attention on this construction. But Singapore as a small island under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew has understood the value of being the maritime and aviation hub in the region and developed the nation to the position. Also, the resistance towards this canal by Malaysia and Singapore was another considerable factor for the refusing of the proposal. But People's Republic of China (PRC) as a regional power has decided to support the Thai Government financially to build this canal with the intention of reaching the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) easily.



Fig 1: Kra Canal

Source: <https://worldlandbridge.com/kra-canal/>

Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world which connects the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. American Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasised once the vitality of Indian Ocean as "whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters." Indian Ocean covers 68.556 million km² and a number of sea are connected to it such as the Arabian sea, Andaman sea, Flores sea, Bay of Bengal, Gulf of Aden, Great Australian Bight, Java sea, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, Mozambique Channel, Savu sea, Red Sea, Strait of Malacca and Timor Sea. With all these resourceful water bodies, IOR has gained the prominence among the global discussions, due to the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) which connects the East and West.

Thirty Two nations can be listed under the IOR and they cover 66,526 km of coastline. Though the IOR is designed base on the Indian Ocean, parts of the East Africa, Arab Gulf, South Asia, the Southern Ocean, Australia and East Asia to the Straits of Malacca also considered while demarcating the boundaries. A number of nations of the IOR were colonized by European countries while moulding a mixed culture. Cordesman and Abdullah (2014) have identified three critical strategic issues to shape up the present and future of IOR. Those are



Fig 2: Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

Source: <https://www.google.lk/search?q=indian+ocean+region>

- The stability and security of the Gulf petroleum export.
- Risk on nuclear power engagements between India and Pakistan.
- Overall security of SLOC and maritime traffic in the region.

Engagement of USA and PRC also cannot be undermined. Especially the military and economic developments in the region are filled by these super powers to achieve their personal goals. Some of their prominent presence in the IOR nations can be identified as follows:

Sr	Super Power	Location in IOR
01.	USA	Australia, Bahrain, Diego Garcia, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Singapore and UAE
02.	PRC	Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Table 1: Engagements of super powers in IOR

Source: http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IOTF_0.pdf

However, the construction of Kra Canal causes a lot of amendments to all these actors in this region. Malaysia and Singapore have to rewrite all the policies since these economies depend mainly on sea activities. Singapore is a nation which was developed gradually in short span of time without having any resources on the land. But they have used the sea as a transit hub and provided essential services for the ships from East to West and vice-a-versa. Kra Canal will destroy these incomes to Malaysia or Singapore or Colombo or Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port (MMRP) in Hambantota they will be the most suitable harbours in the SLOC for essential services. Mainly the ships running from Middle-East to South or East China Seas need fresh water, fuel and other essential items to continue the passage. Then the IOR will be filled with a lot of sea activities, and Sri Lanka and India can enhance the economy by giving more prominence to sea services.




Fig 3: Sea Lines of Communication in IOR and suburbs

Source: <https://www.google.lk/search?q=sea+lines+of+communication>

Shorten the distance to the IOR is one of the vital factors under the 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) concept of PRC. Therefore EPRC is working positively for this canal to connect China Sea and IOR in the shortest way to develop their economic ties globally. Though the China-Thai discussions on Kra Canal have been conducting continuously, outcome is not released to media by both the parties. According to the existing details, this canal will be 102 km long, 400 metres wide and 25 metres deep. This will reduce the ship's passage by 1200 km, two to five days and approximately US\$ 300,000. Besides this canal, South Korea has discussed with the Thai Government to build a train track by connecting the IOR and China Sea. Less Environment pollution compare to the Kra Canal is the main slogan of the Koreans.

However, one of nations should be funded the Thai Government to provide approximated cost of this project that's around US\$ 28 Billion. PRC is decided to fund the project by projecting the future benefits same as in Suez and Panama canals. If a country like India also can engage in the project even partially, may be a positive factor for the future activities of the IOR. This will take around 10 years to complete the project and 30,000 labourers to be attached. This is a good opportunity to the people in IOR to provide their labour force. But PRC may use all their labour force in the project as experienced in ongoing Chinese projects in South Asia like Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Port city project in Sri Lanka etc. Therefore the countries of IOR should maintain a close link with the Thai Government since the inception of the project to gain benefits.

Japan, PRC and South Korea are the countries which are mainly facilitated due to this project. For instance, 80% of oil imported to PRC is from Middle-East. Also, the countries in China Sea believe this project as a solution for the sea piracy in Malacca Strait. Pirates in Malacca Strait cannot reach longer distances for their activities and they have to do their illegalities in International or foreign waters. Also, this canal is a solution for the fear on cutting off the Malacca Strait by USA to break the link of PRC with IOR nations. Addition to that, Thailand will be benefited a lot due to planned port facilities, industrial zones and a refinery.

This might be a solution for the existing ethnic crisis in Southern Thailand. Rubber products also can be exported easily by boosting the Thai economy. Collecting shipping fee will be another considerable factor for PRC and Thailand since.

Some scholars measure the impact of Kra Canal to the region is as negligible. They try to compare this canal with Suez and Panama. One reason is the distance reduced by the canal. Suez saves about 7000 km and Panama reduces about 13000 km whereas Kra canal saves only 1200 km. It will spend considerable time to attract mariners to the Kra canal and authorities have to maintain low tolls for usage of canal. If no mariners will definitely use the path across the Malacca Strait by conspiring less expensive and convenient facilities. Also, Malaysia and Singapore will reduce the charges for facilities if Kra Canal become a threat for their economies. Next point is the geographical location of Singapore shipping hub, in a prominent SLOC of the world with uninterrupted facilities. Also, Singapore creates trust among shipping arena to provide requirements and who else can ensure these facilities in the region. Though the MMRP in Hambantota is the exact location for this task, can Sri Lanka provide all shipping requirements as Singapore does? Sri Lanka may succeed but will take a long time. Therefore, MMRP in Hambantota also should be developed in parallel with the Kra Canal to achieve the real success for Thailand and PRC governments.

Similarly, Singapore is also taking some steps to overcome the Kra Canal threat against their economy. For instance, 'Singapore Telecom' the biggest company of Singapore has decided to offer its chairmanship to a Thai businessman named Chumpol Nalamelieng. He is the head of the biggest Thai company named 'Siam Cement' and he is in close relation with the Thai Royal family. This relationship may positively by Singapore government to convey their difficulties due to the Kra Canal project. Also, some prominent Singapore companies invested in PRC recently to tie-up the economic bonds and, that might be a leeway to please Chinese Government on the project. Addition to that, the American biased statements made by the Singaporean Premier showed that their effort to obtain the support of USA to solve Kra Canal project prior to being a burden for their economy.

However, Sri Lanka should positively work on this project linking the East-West SLOC. Even it is proved in the history, and Godawaya (Hambantota) Port was a hub in IOR to provide all Mariners' requirements. Presently MMRP in Hambantota fulfils all three requirements to be recognized as a modern port in the world. Those are

- a. Natural depth in the sea.
- b. Mainland position close to a SLOC.
- c. Free bare land in area.



Fig 4: Location of Magampura or Magamruhunupura in an old map
Source: <http://mpmc.lk/history.html>

MMRP in Hambantota can cater ultra large container carriers up to 18 metres of draught. Also, continues dredging is not required. This port has about 200 hectares of bay and over 5000 hectares of land for future developments. Further there are no any monsoon effects like in Colombo harbour. Also, the world's marine experts have categorised the MMRP as a perfect place for ship repairs, bunkering, ship building and off-shore services (Pieris, 2017). This is a brilliant place to function as a transit harbour too. Also, the transshipment goods handled in Colombo harbour can be easily shifted to MMRP. MMRP has been identified as a possible location to develop a feeder network with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Indonesia too. For all of these, construction of Kra Canal is mandatory to attract mariners towards the centre of IOR.

PRC, India, Japan and Europe have been recognised as the most benefited parties due to the Kra Canal, besides Thailand. Addition to that, all nations in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) will be facilitated up to some extent. Chinese engagement in IOR will be enhanced massively due to easy access through Kra Canal. This will positively affect the developing countries in the region to develop their economies. But Chinese may enrich their presence as a super power by questioning the activities in IOR. Especially the Submarine fleet of People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) will reach the IOR undetected. PLA Navy cannot achieve the 100 percent secrecy at present since they have to come through Malacca Strait. These activities of PLA Navy through Kra canal may distract the USA's existing deployments in IOR. Therefore, USA will continuously oppose on construction of Kra canal, especially under the preview of PRC.

All the enumerated facts can be summarised as the Maritime power in the IOR across the military, economic and political powers. USA needs to continue their power projection in IOR without having any disruptions from regional powers like PRC and India. Constructing harbours in IOR to fulfil PRC's OBOR concept is the best example this approach. Though PRC state their presence in IOR is only for business purposes, USA and Europe powers are not ready to accept it. In that way, they believe the Kra Canal also another factor to deploy the PRC power in IOR. Even though the PRC is the sixth oil producer in the world, they cannot maintain their existing economy without importing oil from middle-east. Therefore, PRC needs the control of IOR even partially for an uninterrupted oil supply from middle-east via IOR. Further, 85 percent of PRC's trade is based on sea.

It is already planned to build a naval base in the Maldives, exploration of oil in Sri Lanka, strengthening military cooperation with Sri Lankan military by PRC to show their presence in IOR. Kra canal will boost all these activities by changing the present shape of the IOR. India as the regional power in the IOR has to play a vital role to maintain the power balance in the region. Therefore, India should make all endeavours to convert the outcomes of Kra Canal in positive way. Foreword presence by Indian Navy (IN) in the region is one of the options. Involving in Kra Canal construction project is another option. Even SAARC has the option to seek the support from global bodies like United Nations Organisation (UNO). However, PLA Navy is still not capable to deploy their surface units permanently in IOR. In order to have a strong hold over the region, India needs economic assets as well as a strong military presence. India must have access in the region of Chinese influence, by establishing political, economic and security ties with East and Southeast Asian countries.

To conclude, construction of Kra Canal is not easy task due to the obstructions of USA and Singapore. These opposed parties are being succeeded for more than 300 years and they will continue the same force throughout. PRC's live engagement in the project has shown expectations for Thai people and positively affected people in IOR. Due to the PRC's power and OBOR concept which is designed only for economic activities, USA and other world powers cannot directly disturb the activities on Kra Canal. As a maritime nation, Sri Lanka can gain the advantage of Kra Canal by being the maritime hub of East-West SLOC. Construction of Kra Canal will drag for more than ten years and affected parties like Singapore can find alternatives to develop their economies. At last, construction of Kra Canal will be affect the IOR positively and negatively. India has a responsibility as the regional power to control all the activities related to Kar Canal to suit t the IOR.

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FORMING CO-OPERATIVE MARITIME ARCHITECTURE FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

Lieutenant Commander (G) JSD Silva

"The Greater Indian Ocean region stretching Eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, will be the centre of global conflicts, because most international business supply will be conducted through this route. Most important of all, it is in this region the interests and influence of India, China and the US are beginning to overlap and intersect. It is here the 21st century's global power dynamics will be revealed two key players in this region are India and China, India moving east and west while China to the South"

Robert Kaplan,
"Monsoon- the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power", 21 Nov 2010

The Indian Ocean has been gaining unprecedented attraction of regional and extra regional stake holders due to the geostrategic importance of the region in dealing with the current global affairs. This region is diversified and contrasted in terms of politics, inhabitants, economy and environment, as well as being a complex geopolitical framework where external powers and internal states' interests intensely intermingle. International trade travels through the Indian Ocean is two times that of ships passing through the Suez and three times the total numbers navigating through the Panama Canal¹. Fittingly, the importance of Indian Ocean in 21st century is being amply discussed in many regional and global forums. Therefore, the objective of writing this paper is not only to highlight the importance of Indian Ocean but also to investigate and analyse the real challenges in order to identify possible solutions in combating those challenges through pragmatic approach.

Real Challenges in the IOR:

The challenges in the Indian Ocean Region are of more dynamic, unpredictable and diversified nature, to understand the real challenges in the Indian Ocean, it is essential to understand the different perceptions, that Indian Ocean is looked at, some issues are looked at the state viewpoint and some are as global point of view. On the other hand, both military and non-military security challenges have emerged as major issues and grabbed the attention of most. However, this is just like a tip of the iceberg and the real challenges in the Indian Ocean is still remain submerged and un-noticed, like real bulge of the iceberg under the sea.

Even though, it is widely disregarded and unnoticed, the real issues are none other than the conflicting interests of stakeholders in the region. Owing to the same reason, the region is yet to harness the highest known off-shore petroleum reserves². Further, the power rivalry among states has already caused severe damage to the co-operation and consistency of many endeavours under taken with the intention of building mutual trust within the region. The present state of South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) stands out as a failure due to the same uncertainty among member states. Most convincingly, disputes among states, especially maritime boundaries and delimitation issues cause mistrust among neighbouring states. The unbalance of power especially Indian dominance and their strategic approach seeking to convert Indian Ocean towards India's³ Ocean cannot be simply ruled out as India is an emerging superpower who has more potential making the above statement a real. Further, India unquestionably dominates the Indian Ocean region, although Indians are greatly frustrated by the failure of external powers to acknowledge this fact⁴.

¹Denis Ramly, (ed.) Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (Taylor and Francis Group), p.11

²Amita Agarwal: Indian Ocean and world peace nice printing press, Delhi, 2000. 217 pp

³Scott, D., 2006. India's "grand strategy" for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian visions. Asia-Pacific Review, 13(2), pp.97-129.

⁴Erickson, A.S., Walter III, L.C. and Mikolay, J.D., 2010. Diego Garcia and the United States' Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy. Asian Security, 6(3), pp.214-237.

Turning towards Pakistan, trade with China is now a topic of open debate. One of the constraints in its limitedness is that level of relationship only confined to government level. It also denies Indian navy freedom to move in Indian Ocean as deliberate means enhances security of Ocean⁵. On the other end, China's efforts to make security nodes starting from Sudan to China have been increasingly discernible in recent years. This particular endeavour, many argue, is driven by Beijing's military-strategic ends. Nevertheless, such an argument remains a speculation, backed by frail and somewhat disjointed evidence⁶. Similarly, Australian influence to the Indian Ocean region, even though moderate the continent regards Southeast Asia as its geographic centre, and Australia has a vital strategic interest in maritime security of the Indian Ocean, particularly its sea lanes, the intention to enhance a "strategic partnership with India" was emphasized and the 10 degree channel was increasingly featured in Australian defence strategy as higher priority⁷.

The ill-fated reality is that, all those circumstances lead to open up the avenues for outside intruders into Indian Ocean. Whereas, the external entities who have interests in the region pose a serious challenge to the region as a whole. The United States integrated maritime approach⁸ on Indian Ocean astonishingly indicates the freedom and easy access to Indian Ocean in present status quo. In contrast, there is enough evidence that most of the outsiders are having their own interests and those do not reflect as regional or complementary interests in most of the cases. Therefore, it is inevitable that influx of extra regional stakeholders at their own wish, cause intimidation at the regional co-operation. Presently, South China Sea issue showcases the impact of overwhelming influence of external powers that exaggerated the issue into their favour otherwise which could have been settled in different co-operative approach.

Further, external powers only concern the areas of their interest within region, where they form strategies explicitly grapple with those areas, one of the best example can be seen as the Task Force (JTF150) which formed in 2003 to protect merchant shipping near the Sues Canal against Somalian sea piracy, the area of operation is limited to Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC), this warrant the US and other powerful states' contemporary maritime strategy to enter Indian Ocean through sub regional implementation approaches where they only involve in the subregions of their importance and interests⁹.

Now, the sea piracy on Somalian waters is considerably under control and paradigm shifted towards Philippine waters, yet there is no strong involvement as to curb the escalation of activities before situation becomes out of hand, showing that the area is not the higher concerns of those states who regarded piracy as number one maritime threat to the world few years back. Moreover, the violence caused by LTTE terrorists in Sri Lanka was unlikely to arouse much interest among strategic studies sages. This is a pity, because a closer look at the causes of conflict and the reactions of great powers reveal important evidence about the nature of conflict in the third world, the approach of world organizations and extra regional powers were still unconvinced¹⁰.

The contemporary encounters in the Indian Ocean region suggests more challenges on the way headlong due to the very fact that, they had already become the world leading energy and trade interstate sea lane, and the region will matter even more in the future. One reason is that India and China, major trading partners locked in an uncomfortable embrace, are entering into a dynamic great-power rivalry in these waters, a competition that the United States, though now a declining hegemon, can keep in check by utilizing its forward present navy to act as a sea-based balancer to the impending scenario¹¹.

5 Shamsi, S.S., Javaid, U., Sabri, P.S.U., Ilyas, M. and Batool, I., 2014. Compulsions of Sino-Pakistani Strategic Engagement in lieu of Security Constraints Engendered by the Anarchistic International Political System. *South Asian Studies*, 29(2), p.597.

6 Khurana, G.S., 2008. China's 'String of Pearls' in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications. *Strategic Analysis*, 32(1), pp.1-39.

7 Cordner, L., 2016. National Security Interests and the Indian Ocean: An Australian Perspective. *RUMLA Research Paper*, (16-16).

8 Green, M.J. and Shearer, A., 2012. Defining US Indian ocean strategy. *The Washington Quarterly*, 35(2), pp.175-189.

9 Rotberg, R.I., 2010. Combating maritime piracy: a policy brief with recommendations for action. *World Peace Foundation*.

10 Manor, J. and Segal, G., 1985. Causes of Conflict: Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean Strategy. *Asian Survey*, 25(12), pp.1165-1185.

11 Kaplan, R.D., 2009. Center stage for the twenty-first century: power plays in the Indian Ocean. *Foreign Affairs*, pp.16-32.

Need of Co-operative Approach:

United States (US) being the appealing super power in the 20th century, failed to guard its most authentic assets in highly strengthen areas of interests in several occasions. Moreover, some of the attacks were caused irrecoverable damages even to the superpower status such as 9/11 attack and suicide attack upon USS Cole in 2000. Some severe environmental damages due to the BP oil spill at Gulf of Mexico. Thus, the bottom line is that 21 century challenges are very complex, dynamic and unpredictable and no country could singly handle, irrespective of how modern the technology is or how big the military budget a state can afford.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri Jomini and Sir Julian Corbett have provided more comprehensive theoretical approach to implement principles for maritime strategy. In the cause of forming maritime strategy and while upsetting all contemporary ideas, Mahan highlighted the importance of winning 'decisive battle' while Corbett stated that navy cannot operate individually. Astonishingly, most of them highlighted the importance of dominating the sea and only Corbett identified the importance of co-operative strategy. On the contrary, Mahan's 'Decisive Battle' was not a reality and Japanese fleet paid the heavy prize at the Midway battle in Pacific theatre where they lost their entire carrier force in 1942. Gradually by today, even dominating a part of a sea has become beyond the reality due to the transnational security threats, even sea threats dissimilar, across the various seas, littorals, bays and straits that make up the entire ocean¹². Therefore, the term 'Total Sea Control' has become an obsolete term by today.

After the Second World War, by replacing the gunboat diplomacy and power projection strategies navies evolved to be dependent on shared information by means of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), through the integrated activities creating a collaborative information environment in which partners can monitor risks to their maritime interests while promoting the freedoms of navigation, civil liberties and maritime commerce¹³, the uninterrupted MDA and sharing of real time information is of significant importance to the effective naval activities such as surveillance, patrolling, search and rescue and Human Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, also for swift management of activities of commercial nature. However, the incident of missing Malaysian commercial air craft MH 370 has been alarmed and indicated the real implications existing in the region, showing that Indian Ocean region is not yet fully integrated with network centric operations.

The pressing challenge of financial constraints, of course naval defence inflation, universal trend affecting all the navies, individual platforms, sensors and weapons are simply getting more expensive relative to the financial resources available for naval construction, especially in Asian Pacific region has been quite drastic numerical downsizing, while the increased capability of coverage and flexibility suffer from the inescapable fact that, however the individual platform capable of, it can only be in one place at one time.

One of the new challenges evolved in the 21st century is the 'failed state', The regional failed states are being converted in to breeding grounds for violent extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, human smuggling and gun running in the region. Conversely, Afghanistan has become testing ground for both US and NATO forces, where territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan also have been compromised at times. Even though, those missions are executed in order to fulfil their own political ideology and interests, they pretend them as operations of common interest of mankind. The operation to capture Osama bin Laden was such an occurrence took place in 2011¹⁴.

12 Dombrowski, P., 2014. The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and Promoting Security. Georgetown University Press

13 Vance, G. and Vicente, P., 2006. Maritime domain awareness. Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council, 63(3).

14 Gollwitzer, M., Skitka, L.J., Wisneski, D., Sjöström, A., Liberman, P., Nazir, S.J. and Bushman, B.J., 2014. Vicarious revenge and the death of Osama bin Laden. Personality and social psychology bulletin, p.461.

In his famous book 'Monsoon' Kaplan lamented that, Indian Ocean region still remained under developed due to the unresolved disputes and sluggishness in implementation of development projects¹⁵. Further, author has specified that attempts made to enhance regional co-operation just after Second World War and during Cold War period gathered rapid momentum at initial stage, now decelerated and lagging behind, he believes this condition creates good opportunity for US to capitalise the grand strategic interests in Indian Ocean region. Thus, due to the palpable reasons pointed out above, the only option that any region has to survive today is by co-operative approach.

Co-operative Way Forward:

The maintenance of a regional order in which effective practices of security cooperation exist to address the plethora of non-traditional challenges, ranging from terrorism and illegal activities including piracy¹⁶. Therefore, primary concern should be focused on identifying and reviewing the complementary interests and need to formulate co-operative strategy to capitalize the potential capabilities of each and every member in Indian Ocean region, at the same time, identifying and accepting the fact that, there are conflicting interest of regional stake holders specially on the matter of sharing scarce resources which necessitating the establishment of regional mechanism to solve disputes in the region.

A signature feature of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) of its compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms should be capitalized, in particular the significant normative effect in shaping transnational behaviour in the Indian Ocean. The constructive role law can play in harmonizing competing perspectives, not through its formal machinery, but more reliably through its creation of a terms and professional boundary for constructive dialogue and resolution¹⁷. Thus, solving prolonged and unresolved disputes, this is the way forward and, Pertinently, the conducive environment emerged through several regional initiatives, such as The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Galle Dialog and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) are all contributes in formulating cooperative mechanism for regional affairs, assimilated significant factor that, in present status quo favours improved maritime cooperation. The conclude with the various forms that future cooperation might take and speculation as to which are mostly likely in light of evolving state interests and constraints

Co-operation among state actors as well as other stake holders in the Indian Ocean region should be strengthened through prompt modus of operandi and supported by mutual agreements in different fields of interests such as economic, security and environment, since co-operation and co-ordination among neighbour states is pre-requisite for stepping in to applicable maritime strategy, that is unique to the region. Further, in this attempt it is important to endow with special emphasis for identifying common enemy and detrimental activities such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, smuggling of Contraband, gun running and piracy as primary concerns. While; dumping of radioactive nuclear waste, IUU fishing and other activities which harm to the bio diversity of the region also need to cover. The point to ponder here is that the co-operative effort should be initiated against those illegal activities happening in Indian Ocean region without concerning the individual mandates. This synonymous with maintaining law and order in the entire region, this endeavour should contrast from sub regional approaches of US and other external stake holders objectives to address only the selected areas of their interests.

Since, there is no state capable of handling the maritime affairs alone, 'Interoperability' should be the way into the future operations, now the interoperability is not simple phenomenon as pronounced in many discussions and it demands several ground works where co-operation, co-ordination, mutual understanding of operation procedures and common communication links for sharing of intelligence and information. All those ground work should be completed earliest; this is only possible through extensive involvement of interstates and intrastate political, military, diplomatic and technological integration towards common regional policy framework.

15 Kaplan, R.D., 2011. Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the future of American power. Random House Incorporated.

16 Phillips, A., 2013. Australia and the challenges of order-building in the Indian Ocean region. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67(2), pp.125-140.

17 Stephens, D., 2016. Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: 21st Century Opportunities and Challenges: Maritime Governance and the Indian Ocean. RUMLA Research Paper, (16-08).

Once interoperability of regional states is considerably achieved, the 'Interdependency' can be expected. Although it is outlined here as two different concepts, joint or the combine operations and strategic planning are interdependent, one cannot successfully exist without the other. Thus sharing and assigning various assets in dealing with common purpose will be the ideal way forward and this reality should be recognized without further impediment.

A country's response should be commensurate with its level of international trade¹⁸, where fair play and natural justice always deemed fit in dealing with international affairs, India needs to pay serious note on this authenticity, whereas uninterrupted maritime trade is sine qua non for its sustainable development.

Joint and combined inter regional missions should be increased to ensure the security and better control of the maritime activities in the region. The importance of this region to United States is deliberated in many prospects, as an example, President Obama has continued to emphasise the strategic importance of stable energy supplies to US national security interests, with the oil-rich Central Asian region and the maritime routes as key part of global energy markets¹⁹. The region has seen significant economic and strategic prominence for US. Therefore, the US influence is inevitable in the region but it is not an imminent threat if the region is established with law and order.

Common cultures, values, historical bonds and ethics should be capitalized in order to develop as a conjoint region than individual states. The regional identity always prefers and ensures the better representation as regional dialog in global forums, where South East Asia yet to make effective voice. In contrast, the role of the ASIAN in this regard, is more sound and convincing, also the leading role played by the regional super powers for maintaining the higher standards is commendable and standing tall since very inception of the organization, this particular move should be deeply analysed and incorporated as potential role model for South East Asian region too.

Declined diplomatic relations among region should be improved horizontally, vertically and diagonally. Further, political feasibility of adopting any military or economic agreements should be tabled and discussed before open for signature, ratification, accession or approval, where most of the former attempts were failed due to the disagreements on some terms and conditions which could have been clarified if such initial discussions had held or terms of 'reservation' had allowed in some cases. As reserving State proposes, in effect, to insert into a convention a provision which will exempt that State from certain of the consequences which is accepted under certain conditions²⁰.

Sri Lanka as a Mediator:

China had invested heavily in many mega infrastructural projects in Sri Lanka even before Chinese President Xi Jinping's "One Belt, One Road" strategy. On the other hand, Sri Lanka needs China for its economic development and China needs Sri Lanka for its "Maritime Silk Road" strategy²¹. Many discussions are going on and some argues that China should promote the security co-operation of the entire region and safeguard the Maritime Silk route²². Thus, Sri Lanka has become a potent candidate to act as a mediator between China and rest of the states, becoming a maritime hub of great connectivity.

Further, importance of the Indian Ocean region and Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the context of world trade is flying high. Especially, India as a regional power seeks to ensure safety of SLOCs. Sri Lanka being in the mid of maritime route which connect East and West and located very - close to India, always been considered as a country within the 'Indian sphere of influence'. Thus, Indian maritime strategy toward enhancing maritime security needs to strike a balance therefore, co-operative strategies with Sri

18 Rumley, D., Chaturvedi, S. and Yasin, M.T. eds., 2016. The security of sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean region. Routledge. P189-193

19 Raphael, S. and Stokes, D., 2014. US oil strategy in the Caspian Basin: Hegemony through interdependence. *International Relations*, 28(2), pp.183-206.

20 Gamble, J.K., 1980. Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice. *The American Journal of International Law*, 74(2), pp.372-394.

21 Lam, P.E., 2015. Sri Lanka and China's Maritime Silk Road: A Convergence of Interests. *East Asian Policy*, 7(03), pp.114-123.

22 Zhang, J., 2016. Maritime Silk Road and China's Indian Ocean Strategy: An Analysis from the Perspective of Cooperative Security. In *Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2015)* (pp. 65-85). Springer Singapore.

Lanka are imperative²³. Looking at the Australian perspective on the security interests of the Indian Ocean being an interested and influencing stake holder. The maritime system is central to economic and strategic attainment²⁴. Australia and Sri Lanka always worked with higher level of co-operation especially on maritime domain, resulting mutual trust between two countries. Therefore, Sri Lanka would be the ideal candidate for mediating co-operation among Indian Ocean region and Australia.

Sri Lanka being an island nation and sharing very good diplomatic relations among all the regional countries. Further, the rapport that Sri Lanka has gained during the thirty years of prolonged war showcasing resilient attitude even towards asymmetric setting with most fierce and stronger maritime component is acknowledged worldwide. Therefore, the strength that country bestowed in handling maritime affairs is viable qualification to play a mediatory role, which is now being initiated on Sri Lankan soil as an annual maritime event to the 7th consecutive year. Thus, Galle Dialog maritime symposium would be an effective regional voice in time to come.

As a concluding remarks of this paper, the importance in its own right, the Indian Ocean acts as the connective tissue in the broader Indo-Asia-Pacific regions²⁵, in which all countries share vested interests in the optimized stream of maritime use and prosperity. The conflicting interests of inter regional states instead of competition between states is contrasted through this paper. It is emphasized that, the need for co-operation, co-ordination, interoperability and interdependency when dealing with immediate maritime security challenges such as piracy, smuggling, violent extremism, other types of illicit activities, as well as natural and manmade disasters that will allow for a protected and secure maritime environment that enjoys free flow of trade and investment.

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NEUTRALITY AND THE RULES OF NEUTRALITY

Lieutenant Commander RS Jayasekara (SLEAS)

Abstract

For a soundflowing global order, treaties, agreements or accords are a must. The importance of those international rules become still higher in the present trembled world order. But those rules are to be equally abided by both the Powers and Powerless. In 1991, the former Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin Wall was brought down,. On account of this people worldwide were jubilant in the hope that the Cold War ended and the world would be a peaceful place without conflicts, wars, deaths and destruction. But the world was sadly mistaken and disappointed. The West (NATO) started to dominate the world arbitrarily.

Introduction

Neutrality is the condition of being at peace with both the belligerents in a war. It is a condition which can subsist only during the course of a recognized war.

The conception of neutrality is comparatively recent, and we may say that it was practically unknown before the 18th century. The recent development of international communication and commerce led to the idea that the normal course of commerce, trade and other intercommunications among nations should not come to a standstill only because two States or two sets of States have fallen out and are in a state of belligerency. It was further argued that on the outbreak of a war between two states it was possibly for other States (not interested directly with the issues of the war) to remain aloof and impartial so that it would be still possible for the nationals of such states (as chose to keep aloof) to carry on commercial and other types of intercourse with the belligerents so long as they did not decide to take sides. This state was known as the state of neutrality.

The laws relating to neutrals and neutrality have been set forth in the Hague Convention (1907) and the Declaration of London (1909). These laws recognize that neutrality confirms rights on neutral States as well as burdens them with obligations.

The rights enjoyed by the neutral State are :

1. to have its territorial integrity respected by the belligerents.
2. to be able to maintain diplomatic intercourse with the belligerents.
3. to protect its subjects, property, ships in belligerent territory or waters,
4. to be compensated for the violation of its neutrality rights.

The duties of a neutral State are:

1. to be impartial to both the belligerents,
2. to abstain from furnishing with troops, ships, ammunitions of war and money etc. to either belligerent,
3. not to permit the passage of troops of either belligerent through its territory, but it is not bound to check the transit, through its territory, of arm and ammunitions on behalf of either belligerent
4. not to allow any one to use its territory as a base of operation or recruiting ground on behalf of either belligerent.

The above are the general rules relating to neutrality. Special attention, however, must be paid to the maritime laws of neutrality or laws of neutrality regarding maritime matters, such as, matters relating to the use of neutral ports and blockades, matters relating to the carriage of neutral goods in enemy ships and vice versa, matters relating to visit and search of enemy vessels and carriage of contrabands.

Use of neutral ports:

A difference of attitude has been prescribed towards the use of neutral territory by land forces and by the naval units of belligerents. This distinction is based on the realization that land forces usually take refuge in neutral territory when driven by superior pressure of enemy and thereby avoid defeat. But in naval warfare, ships may be forced to seek refuge in neutral waters or ports (not for avoiding defeat but) by stress of weather or other normal incidents of navigation, such as the need of re-fuelling, repairs etc., which are not directly connected with war operations. Hence a limited use of neutral ports and waters is permitted but it is felt necessary that the permissible limits be strictly defined. This was done by the Hague Convention.

It provided for the following rules in this regard:

(a) Belligerents must respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers, that is, must abstain from committing acts in neutral territory which if knowingly permitted by neutrals would constitute a violation of neutrality, eg. exercising the right of search and capture in neutral ports. If any such capture takes place, the neutral power in whose port it happens must secure the release of such captured vessels.

(b) The neutral State must not permit belligerents to establish Prize Courts in its territory or on its waters.

(c) Belligerents must not use neutral ports or waters as a base of operation nor erect wireless telegraphy or similar installations.

(d) The neutral State must prevent the equipment and arming of any belligerent vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise and engage in hostile operations and if such arming of vessels has taken place within its jurisdiction, the neutral State must prevent the departure of such vessels from its jurisdiction.

(e) The neutral State may issue prohibitory rules regarding the use of its ports, but in that case they must apply impartially and equally to all belligerents.

(f) Usually belligerent war ships are not permitted to remain in neutral ports for more than 24 hours, except when necessitated by weather conditions or needs of repairs. This time limit however, does not apply to warship devoted exclusively to religious, scientific or philanthropic uses.

(g) When war ships of both the belligerents (in a war) are simultaneously in the same neutral port, not less than 24 hours must elapse between the departure of one and that of the other, priority of departure being determined according to the priority of arrival. The same rule applies for the departure (from a neutral port) of a merchantman of one belligerent and the warship of another.

(h) When the belligerent warship is in a neutral territory for repairs it can carry out only such repairs as make it seaworthy. No repairs, however, should be carried out which add to its fighting strength.

(i) A belligerent ship can take sufficient fuel from a neutral port to take her to the nearest port of her own country, but warships which take fuel at a port of a particular neutral power may not go for fuelling in another port of the same neutral Power within three months.

(j) Prizes may be brought to neutral waters on account of unseaworthiness of the vessels, stress of weather or lack of fuel and they must leave the neutral waters as soon as the cause of their entry has been removed.

(k) If a belligerent warship fails to leave a neutral port within a specified time, and after due warning to do so, the neutral State concerned should use such measures as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of taking further part in the war and keep the crew detained within the ship; and this will not be construed as an unfriendly act.

Blockade:

When one belligerent Power prevents the access to (or departure from) a defined part of the enemy's coast, then that Power is said have blockaded the enemy's coast. The purpose of a blockade may be strategic or commercial. When a blockade is duly established, and notified it becomes the duty of a neutral State to respect the blockade or else it exposes itself to the attack of the blockading belligerent Power.

Carriage of Neutral Goods in Enemy Vessels And Vice Versa:

The rules in this regard were (first) laid down in the Declaration of Paris (1856) and the present position is as follows.

(a) Enemy goods in neutral ships, except contrabands of war, must be allowed to pass without capture and so also neutral goods in enemy ships. These rules however, necessitate the acceptance of the right of belligerents to visit and search neutral ships on the high seas or in belligerent waters and satisfy themselves that contrabands of war were not being carried by the enemy under the cover of the neutral flag. But this right is granted only to the warships of a belligerent Power.

(b) If on a visit and a search of a neutral ship a belligerent warship is not satisfied about the innocent quality of the cargo and finds that it is liable to detention, the captor takes possession of ship and sends her for adjudication by a prize court.

(c) A neutral ship is not entitled to resist the legitimate exercise of this right of visit and search. If, however, a neutral vessel does resist, its cargo will be treated as if it were found in an enemy ship.

(d) The same rules are applicable in the case of a belligerent ship searched by a warship of the other belligerent, but in this case, of course the belligerent ship may resist the visit and search by the warship of the other belligerent, in which case it must face all the consequences of a naval fight.

Contrabands:

Contrabands are property which can be used in military operations and which has a hostile destination. There are absolute contrabands like arms and ammunitions; and also conditional contrabands which can be used both for the purpose of war and of peace, such as food, money etc. In the latter case circumstantial evidence alone can prove whether a thing in question is a contraband or not.

Absolute contrabands are liable to capture if destined to an enemy territory or enemy occupied territory. Conditional contrabands are liable to capture only if destined to the armed forces or to government departments of the belligerent States.

A neutral ship carrying contrabands may be seized any time during her voyage, either on the high seas or in belligerent waters, but her liability to be captured ceases when the contraband cargoes have been discharged, that is, she cannot be captured on her return voyage.

Since, both the nature and destination of goods determine their contraband character, it follows that neutral destination of goods makes them innocent or non - contraband goods even if they are capable of use for war purposes. To this rule, however, there is one exception, viz., a vessel bound for a neutral port carrying goods likely to be used in war, may be seized (in spite of their apparent neutral destination) if it can be shown that the cargoes were really going to some hostile destination, after reaching the neutral port or (that is) if it is shown that the apparent neutral port was not the final destination of the goods.

This exceptional rule is supported on the strength of what is known as the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage according to which not the apparent but the ultimate destination decides whether or not goods are contrabands. This doctrine is extended to include the continuous inland transportation of the cargo concerned

after reaching the apparent (neutral) destination. As an illustration, let us suppose that there is a state of war between Denmark and Norway in which Sweden is neutral. During this war some conditional contrabands are despatched from another neutral port, London, in a British (neutral) ship destined to the neutral Swedish port, Stockholm. Here, apparently the cargoes are not contrabands because their destination is not hostile. But supposing a Danish warship visits and searches the neutral British ship (Carrying the cargo to Stockholm) on the high seas and is satisfied that after reaching Stockholm the cargoes will be carried over land routes to Norway, the cargoes will be treated as having a hostile destination and hence they will be liable to be captured as contrabands.

Conclusion:

Man's insight helps to make laws and rules for man's own sake; man's vulgarity causes to break them. People worldwide are living today amidst a criminal uncertainty. Wars are exported. The saddest situation is, the mainstream media of the West do never reveal this truth as they too are components of the corporate conglomerates who are responsible to effect a manufactured imbalance upon geopolitics. An articulated voice should be raised against the Power. Donetlel let them to determine the destiny of right to live of the powerless.

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“GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS”: ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND SOLUTIONS

Lieutenant WMPMB Eriyawa

Introduction:

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) plays a pivotal role in World geopolitical arena. Prosperity in Asia depends on natural resource flows across the IOR and globalized supply networks over region by the sea. And emerging global threats like piracy, territorial disputes in the regional seas, terrorism and global environmental issues create significant challenges for policymakers around the region. The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean covering around 20 percent of the world's sea surface and is facilitated by world busiest chokepoints. IOR is bordered by 38 states and those represent nearly 40 percent of the world's total coastline. IOR is inhabited by nearly 2.49 billion people out of 35.7 percent of the world's population. The IOR shows remarkable diversity in the littoral countries in politics, culture, economics, and environment. But most IOR nations still remain as developing countries.

Although its negligence in world arena, the IOR is fortunate to succeed as a forefront of world geopolitics. Propelled by the world's dependence on Gulf hydrocarbons, the importance of the Indian Ocean's chokepoints, unstable socio-political environment and the rise of China and India as global powers, the IOR can be considered as a region of crucial world geopolitics. Also IOR become the most turbulent area of the world in recent decades. As per the statistics in 2011, out of 388 conflicts worldwide, 142 political conflicts were recorded in the IOR including 12 of the world's 20 wars.

The Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention recognizes in regional coastal states like efforts to extend respective maritime jurisdictions, failure to regulate activities in respective jurisdictions, resource management issues, diplomatic disputes, and outright conflicts. In near future one of the most burning issues will be depend on those living resources of the sea and that remain essential to regional economies and food security. But few states will have the capability, resources, and maritime infrastructure to manage these resources effectively. Increasing the capacity of coastal states to manage those maritime resources effectively, will be a critical issue for all the nations in IOR.

The Indian Ocean Region has clearly moved to a more vital position in world geopolitics. Its strategic energy and natural resources, the importance of its shipping lanes, the rise of China and India as major regional and global powers, the engagement of the United States and other Western powers in the region, and the rising environmental risks to coastal economies and communities across the region ensure that the IOR will be the key role in global politics in the coming decades. After the World War II, all the maritime nations have advanced in maritime technology and trade, developed economic value of offshore energy, mineral, and living resources and regained the freedom of navigation and exploitation in high seas.

Maritime Boundary Delimitation:

Maritime boundaries are primarily based on sovereignty over the neighboring states under the rules and principles on UNCLOS. There is a significant body of international law that manages the submission of these principles, but its practical implementation automatically rests on the prior resolution of any disputes regarding sovereignty over the neighboring states. The significance of maritime boundaries in current international relations has grown with the expansion of national limits of maritime jurisdiction in recent decades. Hence, maritime boundary delimitation is now a most important task for coastal States. Maritime boundary can be defined as a legal instrument to divide the earth's water surface into maritime areas based on physical or political characteristics.

Maritime boundaries are established through international conventions and define areas of restricted national rights over the natural resources. The delineation of maritime boundaries always dealt with strategic, economic and environmental implications. But some of the maritime boundaries are overlapped, disputed,

and remained without proper demarcation. Most of maritime disputes occurred due to territorial sovereignty, jurisdictional rights and interests in maritime boundaries. (Dahanayaka 2013) A nation's maritime boundary normally encompasses territorial waters, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones, and is acknowledged by the UNCLOS. According to the law, coastal nation can claim 12 nautical miles of territorial sea and 200 nautical miles of EEZ. A geological concept of continental shelf refers to the continental margin from shore to the point where the depth of the water reaches approximately 200 m. Continental shelf also serves as the underwater continuation of the land territory for maritime nation. The continental margin may include seabed, subsoil of the shelf, but does not include the deep seabed where large deposits of natural resources are regularly discovered. (Tanaka, Kisei. 2011)




Figure 1: Maritime zones

Current Regional Ocean Issues and Disputes

UNCLOS and other international legal bodies provide detailed instructions of rights and obligations maritime disputes. But sometimes those instructions are not that much of effective to solve the maritime issues when they arise and that has led some current maritime disputes in IOR.

Country	Region	Disputes
Kenya	Region East Africa	Unresolved boundary dispute with Somalia
Somalia	East Africa	Unresolved boundary dispute with Kenya
Madagascar	East Africa	Madagascar Claims Bassa da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Island & Juan de Nova Island (Administered by France)
Comoros	East Africa	Comoros claimed French administered Mayotte & challenges France and Madagascar's claims to Banc du Geyser in the Mozambique Channel
Mauritius	East Africa	Mauritius claims the Chagos Islands and French administered Tromelin Island

Seychelles	East Africa	Seychelles claims the Chagos Islands
Iran		There is no agreed maritime boundary between Iraq and Iran along the Shatt al Arab Waterway, which prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab into the Persian Gulf; Iran and UAE continue to dispute the Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island, which are occupied by Iran
India	South Asia	India and Pakistan seek technical resolution of the disputed boundary in Sir Creek estuary at the mouth of the Rann of Kutch in the Arabian Sea; Bangladesh has referred its maritime boundary claims with Burma and India to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea Potential EEZ/CS boundary with Bangladesh
Pakistan	South Asia	
Sri Lanka	South Asia	Indian fisherman violating the IMBL and South Indian government struggling to take back Kachchathiv island issue in to the arena
Bangladesh	South Asia	Maritime Boundary with Myanmar at ITLOS
Myanma	South Asia	Maritime Boundary with Myanmar at ITLOS
Malaysia	East Asia	East Asia Central Couth China Sea with China East Asia Central Couth China Sea with China
Indonesia	East Asia	East Asia Central Couth China Sea with China
Brunei	East Asia	East Asia Central Couth China Sea with China
Vietnam	East Asia	Paracel Islands, Central Couth China Sea with China
China	East Asia	Spratley & Paracel Islands, Central Couth China Sea
Philippines	East Asia	Spratley Islands with China
UK Island Territories	East Asia	

Table 1: Current Maritime Disputes in Indian Ocean region:




Figure 2: Jurisdictional Claims in the Indian Ocean Region:

The issue of Indian fishing vessels violating maritime boundary in to the IML and retrieving Kachchathivu Island back to India by Tamil Nadu government makes a huge threat and dispute between India and Sri Lanka. The number of poaching trawlers brings dangerous to marine environment and creates big diplomatic dispute among two countries. According to the Sirima-Shasthri pact, Kachchathivu Island belongs to Sri Lanka and it is surrounded with rich fishing resources intended to IUU fishing by Indian trawlers.

Determination of national jurisdiction in the South China Sea is posing huge problems to coastal states' interest and their regional potential energy resources. China justifies its claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the heart of the South China Sea based on the records of 15th century. Vietnam and Philippines make claims based on more recent use. But all competitors used to express jurisdiction by establishing settlements and occupation. China won't to seek the jurisdiction through formal dispute settlement processes under the international legal system. (Michel, D. & Sticklor, R. 2012)




Figure 3: Jurisdictional Claims in the South China Sea:

Dispute Settlement:

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides legal agenda for the use of the world oceans. UNCLOS defines collective responsibilities of signatory states and organizations to identify the definitions of their boundaries of national jurisdiction and managing maritime resources beyond their limits. It also provides the conflict resolution procedures for settlement of maritime disputes. Coastal state jurisdiction and navigational freedom may be different from one country to another country. Over fishing, exploitation and harvesting maritime resources beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction still remain as a high possibility to sources of maritime dispute. This is especially important in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, where overlapping claims of sovereignty and most of dysfunctional governments are placing a great threat to the international legal system. (United Nations 1982, "UNCLOS")

The IOR is an area of intense global activity and all the coastal nations bordering to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea are signatories to the UNCLOS. But it does not fulfill all the requirements of member states. Most of its provisions should be resolved through diplomatic channel and some cases still remain highly disputed. As a legal framework, it provides opportunities to improve the regional maritime order. Most of International organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the UN Environment Program play a crucial role to manage the ocean and its resources and resolving maritime conflicts of member states.

The delimitation of maritime boundaries is basically a political matter and the regional parties submitting their maritime boundary disputes to an international court or tribunal for dispute settlement. Before the maritime delimitation, it's very important to concentrate on the sovereignty of the nation and that should be equally assessed on all parties under the international law. The respective states should provide all the evidence like history, occupation, or activities that continued over the claimed territory. The International law provides agenda for the dispute settlement through diplomatic means like negotiation, consultation, mediation, conciliation, investigation, and also judicial means like arbitration and international jurisdiction.

These unconventional dispute resolution means should be promoted through various regional environment and that will help to maintain regional peace, stability, and order. Most of the tensions and disputes can be avoidable but all the regional countries to make sure their commitment and building regional cooperation to prevent such disputes. That will provide the forum to address the regional conflicts peacefully and diplomatically. It's important to build multinational cooperation to manage potential conflicts in the region.

Maritime boundaries for the states are crucial for having good relations and effective ocean management. Because of that nature of boundaries delimitation becomes a serious obstacle and that needs vast range of specialized legal and technical skills. But that needs political will and joint development activities to solve problems in IOR. Continued maritime disputes make the problems on the regional peace and stability. Most of these disputes are connected with unexplored resources and till the end of sovereignty disputes, which cannot be utilized and exploited. But those economically valued natural resources can be used to develop the region by promoting investments. The regional states must commit to cooperation, diplomacy, and peaceful means of settling disputes to explore the valuable resources lying in seabed.

The value of establishing maritime boundaries under the international law and respecting by the international community is patently obvious. The maritime boundary delimitation is to provide clarity and assurance to regional maritime nations to minimize interstate conflicts. And it also promotes the sustainable management and governance of the oceans. Uncertain maritime boundaries will increase the political and security risks and it may lead to extreme diplomatic disputes. Unresolved maritime boundaries can make serious economic losses and may pause the exploration of resources, interrupt fishing, obstruct regional shipping activities, and damage the marine environmental conservation measures, while making intense regional diplomatic disputes. Specially, maritime boundaries will enhance the stability and promote peaceful relations among neighboring nations. (Schofield, 2012)

Conclusion:

Determining zones of maritime power is not related to the law of the sea and these maritime zones were unimportant until nations began to consider the economic value of the resources out at sea. That leads to claim jurisdiction on whatever basis they could justify to occupy those zones.

National interest and public pressure encourage the broadest of interpretation in establishing new baselines and it could exceed the provisions of UNCLOS. The nations may influence on jurisdictional claims of neighboring states or on the freedom of navigation of other maritime nations. In these cases, it could be submitted to arbitral panels of experts in UNCLOS for maritime boundary delimitation to resolve disputes over maritime boundaries under the international law. But still there is a strong willingness for diplomatic procedures more than judicial system to resolve maritime disputes. If these regional maritime disputes are not resolved in the near future, the following outcomes may arise.

Political uncertainty will discourage all economic development of energy resources.

Limited development activities may take place under the state military protection.

The regional states may reach an agreement on an interim joint development regime while retaining their jurisdictional claims.

Regional disputes may be lead into armed conflict.

The Governments that share maritime boundaries have a prime obligation in maintaining good governance at sea to manage the above mentioned outcomes. No individual country will have sufficient power at its disposal to deal with all cross border evils. Therefore, cooperation between countries that share maritime borders must also address the maritime boundary challenges whilst safeguarding their national interests. In the past maritime boundary issue, both India and Sri Lanka had acted in a friendly and cooperative manner by resolving their problems through diplomatic way. This is an example shown to the world by showing that keeping their differences sideways, and come together to resolve maritime disputes to ensure national interests and a pleasant relationship with neighboring states.

In coming decades most of maritime disputes will be become more controversial and conflict prone due to growing demand for energy resources, concerns over sea lanes of communications, the enhancement of regional military capabilities, and cultural ethos in IOR. It's important to have strong discussions avoid such issues with among regional states. Diplomacy is the best option for all regional states to while having commitment to cooperative approaches, joint development, and protecting the marine environment to reduce the chances of maritime disputes.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF AWARENESS OF COMBAT RELATED POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)

Lieutenant KGTM Jayatissa

Introduction:

Combat related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is one of the most common problems military personnel may either experience, witness or confront during their career. Especially in a country like Sri Lanka there is a high tendency of PTSD among combatants since the 30 years of war severely affected not only physically but also mentally to the soldiers and civilians. Sri Lankan forces hold a significant position among all other forces in the world as they defeated the world's most brutal terrorist organization in the world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or the LTTE organization which has the power of land, sea and air. The LTTE severely punished the innocent civilians in their territory and it causes them to develop stress among the society. With the 30 years of war it could be assumed that considerable amount of military personnel is going through PTSD. That considerable amount is mostly undetected due to lack of awareness. Because of that it is very important the general public and military personnel themselves are aware of what is combat PTSD is in the post war scenario of Sri Lanka.

Awareness is highly expected among military personnel because PTSD can be developed by many psychologically well-adjusted and physically healthy people. Traumas happen to many competent, healthy, strong and well-built people. Therefore no one can completely protect him or herself from traumatic experience. Many people have long-lasting problems following exposure to trauma. Up to 8% of individuals will have PTSD at some time in their lives. The US military combat operations which have been conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan draw the world attention on PTSD as over two million people have served in the above mentioned war theaters since 2001. Among that total 711 986 of 1 353 627 who have left military, have used Veterans Administration health care between year 2002 and 2011 (Jayathunge 2012)

The following information provided by the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Survey (NVVRS) conducted by US Department of Veterans Affairs (USDVA): the estimated lifetime prevalence of PTSD among the American war veterans of Vietnam Theater is 30.9% for men and 26.9% for women. In addition to this 22.5% of male and 21.2% of female Vietnam veterans have had partial PTSD at some time in their lives. According to that more than half of all male Vietnam veterans and almost half of all female veterans – in all about 1 700 000 Vietnam veterans have experienced serious stress reaction symptoms. Among Vietnam veterans 15.2% of all male and 8.1% of all female were diagnosed with PTSD by 1986 to 1988. (Jayathunge 2012)

There has been no empirical data which directly focus on prevalence of PTSD among Sri Lankan combatants and veterans, but the 3 year study which was conducted from year 2002 to 2005 by Dr. Neil Fernando and Dr. Ruwan M. Jayathunge reveals that combat related PTSD has been emerging in Sri Lanka throughout the years. In another separate study where the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) has been used to diagnose PTSD, it was identified that 6.7% of combatants were severely victimized to PTSD. According to the results of the study 56 people were found with full blown symptoms of PTSD where the population of the study was 824. As a whole 8% - 12% of combatants are severely affected by PTSD and the worst situation is those patients have not undergone any type of treatment. (Jayathunge 2012)

According to both above foreign and local statistics it is clear that military personnel are highly vulnerable due to the nature of their job. Thus the awareness of PTSD has become such significant in modern war scenario. When a person understands trauma symptoms better, he or she can overcome the fear for such situation and can manage those symptoms in a better manner.

By recognizing the effects of trauma and by having a sound knowledge about symptoms, a person can easily decide about getting treatment. Knowledge is one of the efficient and effective ways of coping with PTSD.

History:

Dr. Jacob Mendez De Costa, described some symptoms among a group of soldiers in 1871. Tachycardia, breathlessness, anxiety and hyper-arousal were some of the symptoms. These symptoms initially referred to as "soldier's heart syndrome" and later it was referred to as "Da Costa syndrome" after the death of Dr. Jacob Mendez De Costa. (Javidi H. 2012)

During the World War I, there were heavy employments of newly advanced weapons and bombs in the combat zones. The introduction of new powerful weapon systems was quite rapid and it sounded as if those machines came from a supernatural source. The soldiers were quite unlikely to believe that they were surrounded by unknown powerful and invisible enemy threats. Some of the soldiers identified with the symptoms such as blue cold extremities, staring eyes, severe tremors, unexplained deafness and blindness and paralysis. This condition was termed as "Shell Shock" by the British military doctors in 1918. Similarly these type of symptoms presented in World War II veterans and the survivors of atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. This condition was then called as "Combat Neurosis or Operational Fatigue". Psychoanalysts changed that term as "Traumatic Neurosis" in 1900s and ultimately the constellation of these symptoms is now termed as "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder" or PTSD. (Javidi H. 2012)

Definition of PTSD:

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) provide a common language and standard criteria for the classification of mental disorders which is published by the American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) defines PTSD as an anxiety disorder. (Affairs 2012)

The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10) is the international standard diagnostic classification for all general epidemiology, and is used for many health management purposes and clinical use. It recognized PTSD as a separate diagnostic entity in 1993. According to that it is a neurotic stress-related and somatoform disorder. (Association 2000)

Diagnostic Criteria:

In 2000 the American Psychiatric Association revised the PTSD diagnostic criteria in the fourth edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) The diagnostic criteria (A-F) are specified below.

Criterion A: stressor:

The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following have been present:

1. The person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others.
2. The person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: in children, it may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior.

Criterion B: intrusive recollection :

The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following ways:

1. Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions. Note: in young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed.
2. Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: in children, there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content
3. Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). Note: in children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur.
4. Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
5. Physiologic reactivity upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event

Criterion C: avoidant/numbing:

Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the following:

1. Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma
2. Efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma
3. Inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
5. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
6. Restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)
7. Sense of foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span)

Criterion D: hyper-arousal:

Persistent symptoms of increasing arousal (not present before the trauma), indicated by at least two of the following:

1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep
2. Irritability or outbursts of anger
3. Difficulty concentrating
4. Hyper-vigilance
5. Exaggerated startle response

Criterion E: duration

Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) is more than one month.

Criterion F: functional significance

The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

Specify if:

Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than three months

Chronic: if duration of symptoms is three months or more

Specify if:

With or without delay onset: Onset of symptoms at least six months after the stressor (Association 2000)

Causes for PTSD:

There are various types of causes for PTSD. They can be categorized as biological, social and psychological. On the other hand both natural and artificial reasons may cause Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Unexpected extreme sudden traumatic events are the main origin of them. Prolonged exposure for traumatic incidents is also one of the main factors that originate PTSD. Experiences in war, violent personal assault, sexual harassments, severe vehicle accidents, natural disasters such as tsunamis, tornados etc., kidnapping, rape are some of the causes.

Symptoms and categories of PTSD:

There are various symptoms of PTSD which vary based on various reasons and background factors. All these symptoms can be categorized under main four types; they are re-experiencing with the event (also called as re-experiencing symptoms), avoiding situations that remind a person of the event), Emotional numbness (avoiding relationships), feeling keyed up or the hyper arousal. PTSD divides into two categories namely acute PTSD and chronic PTSD. According to Javidi and Yadollahie(2012) if symptoms persist for less than three months, it is termed "acute PTSD, if not it is called "chronic PTSD". War related traumatic experiences are said to be the most common reason behind PTSD. Javidi and Yadollahie further stated that armed forces have higher prevalence of PTSD in addition to depression, anxiety disorders and alcohol abuse.

As Jayathunga (2005, p145) stated there are three types of categories in PTSD according to the DSM-III-R classification. They are Acute (beginning within 6 months of the traumatic event but not lasting longer than 6 months), Chronic (beginning within 6 months of the traumatic event but lasting longer), Delayed (beginning or recurring after 6 months and perhaps even many years later) It is some more descriptive classification when comparing with the previous article. It is quite important to understand the symptoms of PTSD when studying about that. As further mentioned by Jayathunga, combat related PTSD involves the exposure to a traumatic event leading to 3 groups of symptoms. They are intrusive memories, hyper arousal and avoidance behavior.

Disturbing the normal living:

Once anybody gets PTSD symptoms it disrupts his or her normal day to day life. It will make it hard to continue with daily activities in the same manner. The symptoms directly depend upon the causative traumatic event. For example, wildfires would significantly cause more symptoms such as somatization, anxiety, depression, paranoia and hostility. The veterans who return back from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had problems such as sleeping disorders and nightmares. (Javidi H. 2012)

There have been identified lots of effects of PTSD that clearly shown by affected patients. In Sri Lankan servicemen who suffer from PTSD have anxiety, chronic tension with irritability, inability tolerate noise (worse in those who were exposed to blasts), repetitive nightmares reproducing the traumatic incident directly or symbolically, impaired concentration and memory, feelings of depression, avoidance of interpersonal involvements, loss of sexual interests, rage and alienation (Jayathunge 2005)

Examples from Sri Lankan society:

There are so many classic examples where the PTSD and combat stress cause to tragic incidents in Sri Lankan society. The most ideal example is Major Anuruddha Wijebahu's incident. In this case a distinguished officer turned into a serial murder as a result of his mental condition. He was a bright student from a leading school from Kandy and he joined the then Kotelawala Defence Academy and passed out as an infantry officer of Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR) of Sri Lanka Army. Major Anuruddha Wijebahu served in many operations and he had to expose for numerous combat related stresses. It causes to change his mental condition gradually and he became a cold-blooded serial killer as he murdered a number of innocent men as a result of his unbalanced mind setup. His last victim was severely tortured in Manthottam camp. He drugged the innocent victim and then he chopped off the victim's body, set fire to the remains. He was caught later and the Army officer committed suicide while in the custody. (Jayathunge 2012)

The story of Army Jine is another example who was an exceptional commando soldier with various combat skills. He was affected by combat stress as a result of serving in operational areas for longer periods. He was absent without leave (AWOL). While in AWOL he engaged in murders, highway robberies, rapes, Jine had committed nearly 27 rapes. He lived in jungle and with the survival tactics that he learned in military he evades the law for a long time. Ultimately he was shot down by the Police. A heroic soldier ultimately died as a serious offender due to his mental controversy. (Jayathunge 2012)

Kadawatha Madhura was a top class sportsman in Sri Lanka Army and he was mishandled by his superiors. He was severely harassed and he underwent work related stress due to heavy work load in his duty. Due to this stressful atmosphere in his working place he was AWOL and joined the underworld. He organized several well-armed robberies mainly in Kadawatha area. Eventually he was shot dead in Kadawatha town by police. (Jayathunge 2012)

Kitulgamaralalage Ajit Wasantha alias Wambotta was another victim of combat stress. He was born in Embilipitiya, joined Sri Lanka Army and enlisted as a member of 3rd Singha regiment. Sometime later he left the Army and formed a criminal gang that consisted of over 50 well armed military deserters. He had the political patronage too. He had done ten murders and a number of extortions with the political protection. At last this gangster was killed by another underworld gang at Kosgama. (Jayathunge 2012) When concerning about all those incidents the awareness of PTSD and combat related stress has been an essential need of the society in order to prevent and to mitigate the negative impact of it upon Sri Lankan society. (Jayathunge 2012)

PTSD denial in modern era:

According to statistics over 200 000 members of Sri Lankan armed forces and police had been exposed to combat situations or combat related situations during past three decades of Eelam war. Traumatic experiences include so many tragic situations such as seeing fellow soldiers being killed or wounded, seeing unburied decomposing bodies, hearing screams for help from the wounded, and helplessly watching the wounded die without the possibility of being rescued. Thus a significant number of soldiers suffered from PTSD. But they remained undiagnosed and were left untreated which will results more bad effects and violent actions upon civil society as above mentioned examples. (Jayathunge 2012)

Sri Lankan authorities neglected the trend of emerging combat related PTSD among Sri Lankan armed forces. The tension of PTSD was mounting in the Sri Lankan military over the years from the beginning of Eelam war. There were so many suicides and self-harming incidents reported from the battle field. The combatants who had PTSD symptoms were directed to active combat areas as they did not possess any physical injury, due to the requirement from the battlefield. Some had behavioural problems and the productivity of them was plummeting. (Jayathunge 2005)

Many traumatized veterans were AWOL and joined underworld gangs. It has become a major threat for the peace of civil society. Until 2005 Sri Lankan army did not medically discharge any soldier on psychological problems. But ultimately due to actions taken by Dr. Neil J. Fernando, the former consultant psychiatrist of the Sri Lanka Army the authorities drew their attention on this issue which will cause a serious damage on the society. The first soldier to get medical discharge due to PTSD was a lance corporal who was a Prisoner of War (POW). He had been kept by LTTE for five years as a POW. (Jayathunge 2012)

Importance of awareness on PTSD:

The awareness of PTSD seemed to be a timely requirement of the society. With respect to the incidents in Sri Lankan society it seemed to be emerging as a social problem. The crimes and murders that were done by combatants have been increasing throughout the years. It had been emerging as a trend. The ideal way to overcome PTSD is improving the knowledge of it. It helps to cope up with the psychological problem. Especially military personnel on ought to have general awareness on PTSD in order to identify and help people to overcome the condition.

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