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2 Sri Lanka Navy Journal

• SLNS Ranagaja. Commanding Officer (CO) held the total
responsibility of the convoy as the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC).

• P485 , P486 and P458. Assigned to Northern Naval Area
(NNA) and tasked to escort up to the North –East Change of Operational
Control (N-E CHOP Line).

• P466 and P473. Assigned to Eastern Naval Area (ENA) and
tasked to escort up to the port of Trincomalee.

• ENA to take over operational command from the N-E CHOP line and
send FACs to continue escort to Trincomalee.

On this day the sea conditions were favourable, thus the convoy reached

the N-E CHOP line around 1700hrs, one hour earlier than the Estimated Time
of Arrival (ETA). It was expected that the FACs coming from Trincomalee arrive
early at the N-E CHOP line and sanitize the area before take over the convoy.
Conversely, the scheduled FACs was not available to take over the convoy due
to its early arrival. Consequently, the OTC ordered P485, P486 and P458 to
continue escort duties further until clear the Mulaitivu sea area as it was the Sea
Tiger strong hold of the Northern province at the time. The OTC felt confident
the units can safely and quickly pass the sea tiger strong hold with much ease.

Figure 1: Convoy Plan
Source: Developed by Author

The units took positions in the convoy as illustrated in Figure 1. P466
and P473 positioned between land and the main body of the convoy (SLNS
Ranagaja) to provide close protection from possible enemy attack approaching
landward. SLNS Pabbatha and L821 were positioned at the ahead and astern
of SLNS Ranagaja respectively. P486, P485 and P458 were positioned trailing
behind L821 with instructions to pass the critical area on the orders of OTC until
arrival of the craft expected to arrive from Trincomalee.