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“Deterrence through Detection” UNCLASSIFIED

21. Hence, a strategy based approach is well conceived and must be pursued with

vigour. It is best understood that small states are handicapped with the luxury of force
structure and size to conceal organizational inefficiencies and flaws.

22. We believe that the efficacy of the Naval Strategy is the foundation of which our

survival, security, safety and defence depends. Fundamentally, we need to ascertain the
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‘critical mass’ required for optimum deployment and employment of our armed forces,
in particular the maritime forces. Thus, the efficacy of the Naval Strategy is directly
proportionate to the ability of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (SAF) and Sri Lanka Coast
Guard (SLCG) to control the surface, adjacent air space and sub-surface to a certain
degree in the defence and advancement of the national interests.

23. The SAF and SLCG in concert are instruments of national power that shall ensure
our National Security Objectives (NSOs) are pursued without undue interference from
external, internal, actual or potential adversaries. In order to execute respective
primary roles of the SAF and SLCG effectively and efficiently, our ability to function in
the maritime domain with a required degree of sea and air control is not an option but a
necessity. In this regard our tasks would be to detect, deter, deny and defeat any form of
aggression and violation of maritime / air jurisdiction or international laws in our Sea
Area of Interest (SAOI).

24. The purpose of this endevour is to articulate a viable operational concept for
Joint Maritime Air Operations in order to maximize the utility and management of
available air assets and resources in the pursuit of National Security, particularly in the
maritime domain. This shall provide the basis where in which the employment of air
power in the maritime environment will be governed in our unique context also
providing for foundation in the construct of relevant tactics, techniques and procedures.

25. In addition, realization of an integrated Maritime Air Component as a force

multiplier complementing Maritime Security Operations (MARSEC), Search and Rescue
(SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) is a desired future
state. Fundamentally, this shall guide force deployment, employment optimally with
judgement in application of air power in the maritime environment.

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SAF have reached the limits of quantitative expansion. This is very evident with the existing turnover
and difficulties experienced in the recruitment processes. Thus, focus should be towards a ‘Force Posture’
where a minimum level (Critical Mass) of personnel, assets, systems, weaponry, and infrastructure below
which no qualitative edge would compensate for the lack of numerical strength. Requirement is to
appraise a ‘Baseline Strength’.
Note: Any attempt in decreasing the quantitative elements (personnel) should not be the priority but
investment in capital expenditure.

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UNCLASSIFIED “Deterrence through Detection”